Volume 7

Issue 1

6-1903

The Forum - Volume 7, Issue 9

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum

Recommended Citation
The Forum - Volume 7, Issue 9, 7 DICK. L. REV. 193 (2020).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum/vol7/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Forum by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please
contact lja10@psu.edu.

THE FORUM.
J

VoL VII

E, 1903

No. 9

Published Monthly by the Students of

THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW,
CARLISLE, PA.
EDITORS.
ANTHONY

ALVIN SHERBINE

HARVEY A. GROSS

T. WALSH, (Chairman).

THOMAS B. WILSON

W. L. HoucK

GEORGE E. WOLFE

BUSINESS MANAGERS.
HENRY M. HAMBLIN,
MECHESNEY

(Chairman).

. EBBERT
EDISON B. WILLIAMSON
EDWIN C. AMERMAN
EDWIN B. MORGAN

GEORGE E. LLOYD

Subscription, $1.25 per Annum Payable in Advance.
ADVERTISING RATES PER ANNMU:
$30.00 per Page; $15.00 % Page; $1.00 Y Page; $4.00 Ya Page.
Address all Communications to

THE FORUM, CARLISLZ, PA.

LAW SCHOOL COMMENCEMENT.
Another year's work in the history of
the Dickinson School of Law has been
completed, and another large class has
gone out to take up the important work
for which they have been so thoroughly
prepared. The close of the commencement exercises, in Bosler Hall, on the
evening of June 9th, marked the graduation of one of the largest classes in the
history of the Law School and terminated
an instructive and enjoyable programme.
The exercises began on Sunday morning, June 7th, with the Baccalaureate
services, in the Allison Memorial church.
Prior to the services the members of the
graduating class of the Law School and
the College, together with the members of
the faculties of the respective institutions,
met on the lawn in front of President
Reed's residence, and from there marched
to the church. That edifice was crowded
to its doors, nearly every church in Carlisle having discontinued services to permit their members to attend the exercises.
The interior of the church was appropriately decorated and presented a beautiful scene. In various corners were flowers

and plants, the rostrum being almost
hidden by great plants and flowers. Seated
on the rostrum were: Dr. Reed; Bishop
Fowler, of Buffalo; Rev. Dr. Craig, of
Newark, N. J.; Rev. Charles M'Crea, of
Ridgewood, N. J., and Rev. W. P. Shriner, pastor of the church.
The services opened with an organ prelude by Claude Stauffer. A large chorus,
the voices for which were selected from
the various church choirs in Carlisle, sang
Scheriecker's "Sing Alleluia Forth." Dr.
Reed and the congregation joined in responsive scripture reading and then a
hymn was sung. Bishop Fowler offered
prayer, after which Miss Prince sang with
much effect, "In Thee, 0 God, do I Put
My Trust." Dr. Reed, president of the
College and Law School, then delivered
the Baccalaureate sermon. He chose as
his text, the words in Second Peter, 3rd
chapter, 18th verse, "But grow in grace
and knowledge of our Lord and Savior,
Jesus Christ."
It was an.eloquent effort, delivered with
effectiveness that held the attention of
its listeners during its delivery. After defining the word "grace," and elucidating
its use in the text, he proceeded to
dwell upon the words in the text upon
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which his discourse was built, the words,
"But grow." He showed that growth
must exist in all realms of nature, in animal life, in physical life and in intellectual
life. The moment growth ceases decay
begins, and in a short while comes the
end. Some men in college grow to be
seniors but they are still freshmen or
sophomores. The ranks of all professions
are filled with such men. They have
stopped growing. The professions are
filled with them. That is the reason why
there are so many failures.
At the conclusion of his sermon, Dr.
Reed sjoke sound words of advice to the
graduates. To succeed in law, he said,
you must be upright and honest, studious
and religious. Religion is just as essential
for success in the law, as in any other profession.
Tuesday evening the commencement
was held in Bosler Hall, where a large
crowd had assembled. The crowd was
composed of friends of the graduates, visitors and residents of the town. Among
the visitors were many of the alumni.
President Reed presided at the exercises. Seated upon the stage with him
were Dr. Trickett and the Law School
faculty, several of the incorporators of the
school and several distinguished visitors,
among whom were: Hon. Gustav A. Endlich, of Reading, Pa., associate judge of
Berks county; Judge W. F. Bay Stewart,
of York county; Judge Bouton, of
Smethport, McKean county; Edwin L.
Dively, Democratic candidate for judge
of Blair county; Gen. Horatio C. King,
of New York.
A large orchestra, under the leadership
of Claude Stauffer, played several selections. Judge Endlich then delivered the
Baccalaureate address, the subject of his
theme being "Individual Liberty and
Thought." The address is printed in full
in another part of this journal. It was a
scholarly talk filled with high thought
and eloquence.
Degrees were then conferred by President Reed, the candidates receiving their
diplomas as Secretary Wood called their
namts.
Dr. Reed congratulated the class and
spoke words of advise to them after which
the prizes were awarded, when the exercises closed.

NOW ATTORNEYS AT LAW.
On Wednesday morning, June 10, the
members of the Senior class of the Law
School, who expect to practice in Pennsylvania, on motion of Mr. Graham, secretary of the local board of examiners,
were admitted to practice in the several
courts of Cumberland county. Judge Biddle held a special session of court in order
that the class could be admitted. After
administering the usual oath, his honor
delivered a few words of advise to the
class, reminding them that success in
their profession depended entirely upon
individual effort. The members of the
class who were admitted were as follows:
Walter P. Bishop, Johnstown, Pa.
Victor B. Bouton, Smethport, Pa.
Geo. W. Cisney, Tyrone.
D. Lloyd Claycomb, Alum Bank, Pa.
William N. Cooper, Carlisle, Pa.
Paul A. Core, Washington, Pa.
LeRoy B. C. Delaney, Harrisburg, Pa.
Roger J. Dever, Freeland, Pa.
Chas. H. Drumheller, Harrisburg, Pa.
J. Mechesney Ebbert, Greencastle, Pa.
H. C. Fox, Harrisburg, Pa.
Fred. B. Gerber, York, Pa.
Harvey A. Gross, Hall, Pa.
Henry M. Hamblin, Carlisle, Pa.
Chas. G. Hickernell, Schaefferstown, Pa
Clifford D. Jones, Edenburg, Pa.
C. H. Keelor, Philadelphia, Pa.
A. S. Longbottom, Crum Lynne, Pa.
R. B. Miller, New Cumberland, Pa.
G. S. Mowry, Alum Bank, Pa.
I. S. Peightel, McConnelstown, Pa.
Alvin Sherbine, Wilmore, Pa.
H. S. Vastine, Riverside, Pa.
Anthony T. Walsh, Pittston, Pa.
Jno. F. Watson, Bloomsburg, Pa.
E. B. Williamson, York, Pa.
R. M. Wright, Huntingdon, Pa.
A. Irving Yeagley, Lebanon, Pa.
E. L. Dively, Altoona, Pa.
Geo. E. Lloyd, Mechanicsburg, Pa.
Adam B. Vera, Custer City, Pa.
Thomas B. Wilson, Bradford, Pa.
Win. A. Shomo, Harrisburg, Pa.
PRIZES.
The following prizes at the end of the
present term were awarded:
William C. Allison Prize to Fred. B.
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Gerber, of York, for best work in Constitutional Law.
William D. Boyer Prize No. 1 to W. L.
Houck, of Berwick, and Thomas B. Wilson, of Bradford, for excellence in Law of
Evidence.
William D. Boyer Prize No. 2 to John
E. Rauffenbart and James P. Hedges,
both of Atlantic City, N. J., for superiority
in work on Contracts.
William D. Boyer Prize No. 3 to George
E. Wolf, of Johnstown, for best examination in Torts.
The Dean's Prize to Edward B. Morgan,
of Wilkes-Barre, James P. Hedges, of
Atlantic City, and Elmer W. Ehler, of
Harrisburg, for best work in the law of
Real Property.
THESES.
The following is a list of the topics upon
which the graduating students of this
year have written :
Opinion Evidence-Claycomb.
Husband and Wife as Witnesses-Core.
Origin and Organization of Courts of
Record in Pennsylvania-Walsh.
Title by Descent-Kress.
Fixtures-Knappen berger.
Riparian Ownership-Longbottom.
Legal Status of Women in Pennsylvania-Lloyd.
Master's Liability for Servant's Wrongs
-Philips.
Jurisdiction of Justices in Contract
actions-Wright.
Insurable Interest-Cooper.
Effect of Illegality upon ContractsWilliamson.
Sunday Law in Pennsylvania-Dively.
Contractual Liability of Infants-Gross.
Landlord's Right to Distrain for Rent
-Cisney.
Distress for Rent in PennsylvaniaYeagley.
Execution of Wills-Delaney.
Malicious Prosecution-Vastine.
Effect of Admissions-Druniheller.
Liability of Employer to EmployeeGerber.
Jurisdiction of Justices in Tort actions
in Pennsylvania-Dever.
Character as Evidence-Kauffman.
Confessions-Ebbert.
Liability of Corporation for Torts of its
agents-Miller.
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Release of Damages-Keelor.
Jurisdiction of Justices in ContractsBouton.
Title by Descent-Vera.
Divorce in Peunsylvania-Sherbne.
Landlord's Remedy of Distress-Jones.
Contractual Power of Married Women
in Pennsylvania-Shomo.
Jurisdiction of Justices in ContractsWatson.
Distress for Rent-Bishop.
Statutory Rights and Liabilities of Married Women-Hickernell.
Orphans' Courts of New Jersey under
Act of 1898-Albertson.
Confessions-Wilson.
Mechanics' Liens-Fox.
Equitable Conversion-Peightel.
Equitable Defences in Suits on Promissory Notes-Hamblin.
Probate of Wills in PennsylvaniaMowry.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Clark, '01, was recently nominated on
the Republican ticket for District Attorney
of Warren county. The county being
nominally Republican, and Mr. Clark being a strong candidate, his chances of be
ing elected are considered bright.
Among the alumni who were in town
during the commencement exercises were
the following: Hon. L. P. Holcomb, '01,
of Wilkes-Barre; G. B. Stevens, '99, of
Reading; F. A. John, '00, Mt. Carmel;
Marker, '93, Greensburg, Pa.; Philip M.
Graul, '01, Lehighton, Pa.; Samuel E.
Basehore, '01, Mfecbanicsburg, Pa.; N. R.
Turner, '01, Easton, Pa; Wm. D. Boyer,
'92; Clarence E. Vallentine, '95, Scranton,
Pa.; James C. Houser, '02, Lewistown,
Pa.; H. R. E. Mays, 02, Reading, Pa.; S.
C. Boyer, '93.
During the month, Fought, '03, Mt.
Carmel, was in town. He was accompanied by Judge Savage, of Sunbury.
Miller, a member of this year's graduating class, has made application for examination for admission to the Maryland
Bar.

Miss Marvel, '00, was in town during
the commencement exercises.
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Announcement has been made of the
engagement of Miss Sara Marvel, of Atlantic City, and George Coles, of Lykens,
Pa., both members of the class of '00. We
extend sincere congratulations and wish
them happiness and prosperity.

SCHOOL NOTES.
The Senior class held its annual outing
on June 2nd, at Mt. Alto, a delightful resort in the vicinity of Chambersburg.
Leaving Carlisle on the 8:39 a. m. train
they arrived there at 11 a. m. and returned
to Carlisle on the 10.05 p. m. train. During the day the class held a meeting and
decided to hold a re-union in Carlisle during the commencement exercises in the
year 1906. Walsh was elected secretary
and was empowered to make the necessary arrangements for the re-union.
At a meeting of the members of tle
base ball team just before the close of the
term, Wolfe, '05, was elected captain of
the team for the next year. This election
gives universal satisfaction.
The new
captain possesses all the qualifications required of an incumbent of that position..
He knows the game thoroughly, plays
steady and consistent ball at all times,
and knows how to handle men. Besides,
he Is quick to see a point, and is not afraid
to act when the occasion requires. Under
his leadership Dickinson should have another strong team next year.
George E. Lloyd, George W. Cisney and
Henry M. Hamblin took the degree of
Master of Arts from the College.
Harry A. Hillyer, '04, was unanimously
elected leader of the Mandolin and Guitar
Club, on June 10th, the morning after the
club's annual concert. Mr. Hillyer will
make an ideal leader, being a thorough
musician and an energetic worker. Claude
Stauffer, who was a member of the class
of '03 for the first two years, but who
dropped the study of law to complete his
college course, was elected president of the
musical organization and director of the
combined Mandolin and Guitar and Glee
clubs.
Among the distinguished persons who
attended the commencement exercises of
the Law School were Judge and Mrs.

Bouton, of McKean county, parents of
Victor B. *Bouton, of the Senior class;
Judge W. F. Bay Stewart, of York, uncle
of Gerber, of the Senior class, and Mr. and
Mrs. B. L. Dively, of Altoona, parents of
R. V. Dively, who graduated in the two
years' course.
On Tuesday evening, June 9th, before
the commencement exercises, Hon. W. F.
Sadler, at his residence, entertained at a
dinner in honor of Hon. Gustav Endlich,
the commencement orator, the following
distinguished persons: Hon. Gustav A.
Endlich, associate law judge, Reading, Pa.;
Hon. J. Bouton, president judge of
McKean county; Hon. W. F. Bay Stewart, associate law judge, of York county;
E. L. Dively, Democratic candidate for
judge of Blair county, Gen. Horatio C.
King of New York, and Dr. Trickett.
DELTA CHL
The tenth annual banquet of the Delta
Chi fraternity, in Assembly Hall, on the
evening of June 5th, brought together
every member of the local chapter tnd
many members of the alumni. The menu,
the postprandial exercises and the reunion of the alumni and active members
made the affair stand out prominently in
the annals of the Dickinson chapter. Paul
A. A. Core, presided as toast master.
After the completion of the formal programme, during the rendition of which
several inspiring songs were sung in
chorus, short addresses were delivered by
the members of the alumni who were
present. Those who responded to formal
toasts were F. A. John, '00, A. S.
Longbottom, '03, T. B. Wilson, '03, M. Patterson, '05, Hon. Frederick Fleitz, and A.
L. Dively, honorary members; P. Graul,
'01. The informal speeches were delivered
by Stevens, of Reading, 99, Marker, of
Greensburg, '93, Shapley, of Carlisle, 94,
Holcomb, Wilkes-Barre, '01.
The speeches, both formal and informal,
were filled with wit and eloquence and
were greatly enjoyed.
Those present were: Paul A. Core, A.
S. Longbottom, A. T. Walsh, Joseph P.
Fleitz, Harry A. Hillyer, F. P. Benjamin, E. V. Dively, Thomas B. Wilson,
A. B. Vera, Howard Prickitt, Jos. P.
Knappenberger, W. L. Houck, Foster
Heller, M. Patterson, Leo J. Schwartz-
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kopf, Chas. Spencer, A. L. Dively, G. B.
Stevens, F. A. John, P. Graul, J. Shapley and M. Marker.

LOVING

CUP
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and of a happiness that shall deepen and
broaden with the years. May Heaven be
kind to you. Valete et salvete.
Affectionately yours,
WILLIAM TRICKETT.

PRESENTED TO DR.
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND
RESPONSIBILITY.

TRICKETT.
The members of the graduating class of
1903, some time before the end of the
school term, decided to manifest in some
manner their deep affection and great respect for Dr. Trickett. Accordingly it
was decided to present him with a loving
cup, the class considering that this would
be an appropriate demonstration of their
love for the man and their respect for the
scholar and instructor. Arrangements
were made to present the cup at the commencement exercises of the Law School,
on the evening of June 9th, but this could
not be done, the cup not arriving until a
few days after that event, and after the departure of many members of the class
from Carlisle. Upon its arrival, it was
presented to Dr. Trickett by a committee
of the class who remained to perform that
pleasant duty. It will please the donors,
who were not so fortunate as to be present
when the presentation was made, to know
that their token is in the hands of the
donee, and that he appreciates the motives
that prompted its giving. In expression
of that appreciation, he issues the following communication:
To THE M EBERS OF THE CLASS OF
MY DEARt FRIENDS-

1903.

I desire, through this medium, to
thank you very earnestly for the beautiful
token of your friendship, received after
the departure of most of you from Carlisle. I shall treasure it as a sacred reminder of the last happy three years, during which by numberless kindnesses and
courtesies, you have rendered my relations with you so pleasant. In the sorrow
which your going, never to resume your
old associations at the school, has left behind, the only consolation that remains is
that which springs from the confidence
that you will not cease to remember us
nor allow your interest in your Alma
Mater to abate, and from our sure anticipation for you of a professional success that,
coming early, shall grow until life's decline-and may that be long deferred-

(Baccalaureate Address delivered by Hon. G. A.
Endlich, Judge of the Twenty-third Judicial
District.)

I have in mind that I am addressing an
audience whose sympathetic interest centres upon a band of young gentlemen
about to pass from this venerable school,
where their pursuits have been ordered by
the solicitous care of their elders, into the
broader school of life, where the method
and measure of their progress will be
largely in their own hands. Advisedly I
say, "largely in their own hands"; for it
will not be given to any of them to be
wholly their own masters. Each is to
find and take his place in a profession that
subjects its members to a code of ethics
none may violate with impunity. Each
is to find and take his place in a social
organism that surrounds him with conventional restraints and duties admitting
of no escape save under penalties endurable to but few. Each is likely to find
and take his place in a political connection which will exact his acceptance of
obligations more or less searching and will
jealously scrutinize his conduct with reference to them. And so of a multiplicity of
other relations which each may or may
not enter into. Not one of them but will
bring with it characteristic demands and
limitations, circumscribe the freedom of
spontaneous action, and create new, as
well as modify preconceived rules of conduct. The complexity of these relations
in modern life, and the unrelaxed pressure and constant inter-action of the conceptions peculiar to each, have a vast deal
to do with directing behavior and moulding principles. In a civilized community
every individual is bound to give up some
of his liberty of thought and speech and
action.
Not only is he constrained to
obey the laws of the State; but to some
degree he must hold himself subject to
the traditions and caprices of his professional, social, political, religious and business associations, and permit his course to
be shaped, his work assigned to him and
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the sphere of his ambitions and achievements defined by them. Living in the
world, we also in an important sense live
on the world. It is but just that the
world, which affords us our living, should
have something to say as to the manner
and spirit in which we shall earn it. The
world finds out what a man is good for,
if he is good for anything, and helps- him
who helps himself to push into the place
he can fill. The trouble with so many is,
either that they strive for what they are
unfitted for, despising that in which they
might excel, or that aiming at what is in
the line of their abilities, they yet refuse
to strain their whole energy towards its
attainment. These in part are they that
fall by the wayside; for the world ordinarily declines to aid a mistaken purpose in
life, as well as one legitimately selected
but feebly prosecuted. The world owes
no man a living save in the poorhouse;
but it yields every man a living who is
willing to labor at what he is fit for and to
do with his might whatsoever his hand
finds to do. The helpful thought for
those embarking upon their voyage of uncertain destination is, that there is room
in every department for all who are content to occupy those stations to which they
are equal, and faithfully and unwearyingly
to servein them. That the inevitable measure of subordination of the individual to
his surroundings implies his acceptance,
to some extent, of their ethical doctrines,
is very obvious. Doubtless he who is
most thoroughly in accord with his environment, its moral as well as its material aims, is in a position to exploit it to
the greatest advantage to himself; and
doubtless the possibility of profitably
laboring in any environment is diminished by antagonism to its moral views
and aspirations. How powerful an agency
self-interest is in molding our principles
needs not to be discussed. The average
man is wellnigh helpless in its grasp; the
most exalted, not exempt from its influence. It stands to reason, therefore, that
men will take much of their morality
from what they find to be the prevailing
thought among those with whom they
are allied, to whom they look for countenance and upon whom they lean for support. And the more numerous and intimate these alliances, the more that process

of absorption from, of accommodation to,
one's surroundings, will tend to fill one
with views representing, not the outcome
of one's own reflections nor one's independent deductions from absolute maxims
of right and wrong, but the collective or
average morality of the various circles to
which one belongs and the engrafted doctrines of the associations with whom one's
deepest interests are bound up. I do not
say, one's material interests. I would not
so belittle mankind as to regard its morality as a matter of mere bread and butter.
I say one's Ideepest" interests, which
may, of course, be material, but which
may as well be intellectual, professional,
religious, social or political.
It is hardly needful to remind you how,
at this time more strikingly than ever before, the universal trend is towards association, aggregation. In trade, industry
and commerce, individual resources are
merged in corporate enterprise. Much of
the business of the age cannot be carried
on except by the instrumentality of vast
corporations. But this is the day of overindorporation, largely for the purpose qf
limiting personal liability. And of the
concerns thus formed members are again
united under central managements and
become trusts or pools or combinations.
On the other hand, the different departments of labor are organized into unions
acting collectively, and forming units in
broader federations. Even the business
pertaining to the profession of the law is
being largely conducted by great lawfirms employing specialists and subdividing and systematizing the work much
after the pattern of a well-ordered department store. Everywhere, the individual, the natural person, is moved
into the back-ground, the collectivity, the
artificial person, comes to the fore. Now,
I have not a word of wholesale condemnation for any or all of these things; nor am
I here, a voice crying in the wilderness,
to predict blighting evils as likely to result
from them to the body politic,-sure to result, as many are prepared to demonstrate
on the basis of a flawless logic, whose
signal merit, when applied to the great
problems of humanity, is in the fact that
it may with certainty be relied on never
to hold out. To the calm and thoughtful
mind all these phenomena of trusts and
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combinations, whether of capital or of
labor, and whatever else in that line is
presently disturbing the slumbers of the
timorous, or through mistaken zeal and
ignorance of rights and duties and of the
immutable laws of social and economic
forces is here and there hampering the
even progress of affairs, -all these are but
characteristic of a passing period in our
civilization,-an experiment, that must be,
and in spite of everything that can besaid
and done, will be, thoroughly tested, to
give way in due season to something
better and more efficacious. To attempt
to stop such a movement before it has exhausted itself is as wise as the attempt of
the fabled king to stop the swelling tide
of the ocean at a line drawn upon the sand
of the beach. It may, indeed, prove worse
than futile. At no time are men more
firmly convinced that they are on the
right track than when they are engaged
in a plausible experiment whose possibilities of failure have not yet been demonstrated by experience. At no time are
men more willing to fight for an idea,
than when, filled with enthusiasm by its
pleasing novelty and ignorant of its latent
weaknesses, they are opposed in its execution by those who have no other practical
knowledge of what it must ultimately lead
to. Reasoning from analogy, in such
case, amounts to nothing. Differentiating circumstances can always be discovered and urged, convincingly to him who
wants to be convinced, against the likelihood that the new departure will entail
the same inconveniences a similar one
brought with It in the past. Opposition
begets stubbornness and bitteriess, and
the upshot is that the completion of the
experiment is deferred,-if, indeed, its
progress be not marked with incidental
financial and worse calamities. But one
thing is sure, that it will be wrought out
to its consummation, sooner or later,
amicably or otherwise, without convulsions or with convulsions, and that the
world will not be spared the whole lesson
of it.
In the meanwhile it is well for thinking
men to look about them and take their
bearings. Great social and economic movements are intricate of analysis and full of
potentialities, both for good and for evil,
which do not lie upon the surface and
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which contemporaries can neithergrasp in
their entirety nor accurately balance in
detail. It is, however, possible to discern
some of their salient tendencies and
to approximate their necessary outcome.
Granting the irrepressible nature of such
movements, it then becomes the part of
wisdom to endeavor so to influence and
direct them as to neutralize that which is
pernicious, while aiding the development
of what is harmless and possibly beneficial
in them; so that the nation and humanity
may suffer no permanent injury by their
passing. That no legislation, no show of
force or authority can provide what is
needful for this purpose is a proposition
which, I assume, will be self-evident to
every student of history. An express
train once underway and gathering speed,
cannot be stopped, without a crash, by an
external impediment thrown across its
path. It must be controlled by forces applied through its own mechanism. And
so, the mighty movements of our race
must depend for their peaceful regulation
and for their harmless evolution upon influences exerted within them, under the
pressure of that subtle but overmastering
agency we call public opinion.
There can be no doubt that among the
manifest effects of the associative tendency
of our times the one most calculated to
give rise to apprehensions of lasting detriment is the obliteration of individual initiative, responsibility and conscience. In
the corporation, the individual stockholder is represented by the directorate
and executive officers. As a stockholder
he profits by their acts and is bound by
them whether as an individual he would
approve them or not. All this results of
necessity from the legal view of his relation to the corporate entity. But more
than that: as a man, he is ordinarily not
held at all accountable for the moral quality of the corporate acts he benefits by.
In the larger combination, denominated a
trust, the individual's remoteness, as well
as his insignificance and unaccountability,
is still more emphasized. In the union,
the individual obligates himself to obey
the decrees of his associates. His personal sense of right and wrong is allowed
no voice in deciding whether in any special
instance he will do so or not: and that
self-imposed duty of obedience is urged in
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liberty as we understand it. It had an
bar of his moral accountability for what
euphonious polysyllable that denoted the
he does in pursuance of it. And so in
politics, and indeed throughout all the condition of a citizen as distinguished
from that of a slave, and implied the right
mass and complexity of the modern asof equal participation in government. But
sociative world,-everywhere the practical
it had no term by which to describe Lhe
way of dealing with difficulties involving,
independence under the law of the innot only questions of expediency, but
dividual as against the state and in relaquestions of right and duty, is to make
tion to his fellows. Indeed, it had no
them the subject of collective decision,
single word synonymous with the noun
ordinarily at the hands of some delegated
"individual." Thefact is that the Greeks
authority, a council, an executive board,
had no conception of individual liberty.
a standing committee, a convention, or
Their government, in the classic age, was
whatever it may be called; to demand of
a popular absolutism without any guaranall a compliance with its pronouncement
tees of individual rights. In their reasonwhich amounts to the moral effacement of
ingthey began with the state as the source
the individual and a virtual abolition of
of everything and deduced every relation
his personal freedom of action; and to
of the individual from that position. They
predicate upon his self-renunciation absonever discussed his rights, because as
lution from all personal responsibility.
That this is a convenient and for tem- against the state he had none. They assumed that a supreme power must reside
porary purposes effective arrangement may
somewhere. If it resided with the masses,
readily be conceded. But let me tell you
there was no hesitation about conceding
that there is none to be conceived more
its completeness, its sufficiency arbitrarily
utterly at variance with the history and
to regulate every detail of public and prihereditary character of our race and the
vate life, and its utter irresponsibility.
fundamental principle upon which our
Socrates, innocently condemned, declined
civilization and institutions are founded,
to escape on the ground that, the state
or with the very essence of the religion we
having ordered his death, though unprofess.
justly, he had no right as a citizen to
In the early dawn of social order, upon
withdraw himself from its decree. The
the highlands of central Asia and in its
loftiest speculations of Greek political phifertile valleys, men bound together by
losophy logically led to nothing but a reties of blood were gathered in tribes,
fined communism in which even the
which were but great families, roaming
family relation was not to be altogether
from place to place in searchof pasture for
conserved. So utterly were the worth
their herds under the leadership of an
and dignity of the individual sacrificed in
hereditary head, the patriarch. Zle was
studying the welfare of the state,-to such
absolute ruler of the horde, owner of all
absurd lengths was carried the supposed
the property there was, spokesman, reprenecessity of sinking all individuality in an
sentative and high priest. The nomadic
indistinguishable mass of citizens, all
age knew nothing of the individual as a
upon a dead level of equality, that even the
social unit. The tribe, personified in the
right to be virtuous or patriotic above
patriarch, was the unit. And so in all
one's fellows was denied. Themistocles
those countries whose polity is patterned
was banished because of his supreme serafter the patriarchal type, the source and
vices to his people, Aristides because of
fountain of social and political power is
his preeminent uprightness and devotion
the head of the organism, and individual
to the public interest, and Socrates drank
rights exist only in subordination to its
despotic will. It is upon no such founda- death as a punishment for his purity and
tion that the structure of American insti- wisdom.
Nor will you seek with better success for
tutions has been reared.
a recognition of the individual in the
Neither have we borrowed aught from
Roman commonwealth. We have taken
the spirit of the so-called republics of
ancient Greece. The beautiful and ex- from her stately idiom the phrase Res
_Pulica, wherewith to describe our state
pressive language of Athens contained no
and our form of government. We have
word equivalent in meaning to the word
200
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derived from her institutions the descrip-
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sarily surrendered some, but as small a

tive names of many of our own. We have modicum as possible, of his individual
gone to her well-stored legal treasury for a
rights and liberty. Beyond this, every
variety of principles wherewith to broaden
head of a family was his own and his
and strengthen and elevate our jurishousehold's lord, a sovereign within his
prudence. Happily we have thus far re- own domain, as free and independent as
iained strangers to her system of class
the birds of the air. His allegiance to the
interests and representation, to her pater- chosen chief of the tribe was in no way
nalism, to her apotheosis of the state, and
similar to the allegiance of the citizen of
to her ingenious devices for the social and
Rome or Athens. It was not a political
political degradation of the individual.
allegiance to the state conceived in the
Greece and Rome have passed away,
abstract; for there was no such thing,but the lesson of their history will never
but a personal fealty, the loyalty of man
pass away. The riches of their art, their
to man. And as time went on and the
poetry, their philosophy, their military
rudimentary conditions or barbaric existscience, their statesmanship, their jurisence gave way to more complex ones,prudence, are left for our instruction and
as tribes and clans by stress of external
admiration. Their examples of heroism
pressure, were driven to confederate toand devotion to duty abide for our inspira- gether under chieftains holding broader
tion. But inseparably linked in painful
sway, the relation originally established
contrast with these stands forth the record,
between the minor chiefs and their reswelling as the centuries rolled on, of brutainers, was continued in all its chartality, civil oppression, public and private acteristic features, between those chiefs
corruption and licentiousness, and in the
and the supreme head, now called king
end, of ufiiversal decay. Surely, this
and emperor. Transplanted in all its
speaks to us a language we ought to be simplicity and vigor upon English soil,
able to make out. It is not enough to say
this distinctively Teutouic idea took root
that Greece and Rome had not the enthere, never again to be dislodged. In
lightenment of Christianity. There were
Germany, to be sure, much of it has been
great thinkers in both who saw moral
lost. Buffeted by invasions, exhausted by
truths with the clearness of inspired
internal wars, indoctrinated by the prinvision, and lived lives as pure and formuciples of the civil law, cowed by princes
lated teachings as sublime, as those of de- of great energy and self-assertiveness, and
vout Christians; and the Roman empire
inifluenced on the one side by the Latin
became Christianized before its final downnations still shadowed by the traditions of
fall. The truth is that "the beauty that
ancient Rome, and on the other by the
Slavs adhering to an essentially patriwas Greece and the glory that was Rome"
could never have faded into the hideous- archal system, the people of the German
ness and shame of their decadence, had states have accommodated themselves to a
their social and political fabric contained
good deal of what we call police-governwithin it that element of endurance and
ment and have been deprived of a great
self-regeneration which resides in a people
share of their ancient heritage. But in
conscious of the dignity and responsibility
England, notwithstanding the repeated
attempts of the Stuarts to break down the
of the individual.
Now consider, for a moment, the be- consciousness of the people that they stood
ginnings of our Teutonic civilization. In
a nation of freemen, that the state was
made for he well-being of the individual,
them we find neither the patriarchal form
not for his absorption, that all the priof government, nor an iron-bound state as
it was viewed by Greek or Roman. We
mordial and natural rights capable of being exercised consistently with public
find associations of freemen, whose remote
order and national safety are his by
blood-relationship sat but loosely upon
them, into tribes or clans, under elective
birth, and that his are the power and
duty to use them and the responsibility
leaders, for common defence and aggression. For the regulation of internal mat- for the use he makes of them-in Engters in the interest of peace and order and land there never has been a time when
this fundamental principle has for any
effective organization, each freeman neces-
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considerable period been successfully obscured. And that is the principle that
lies at the foundation of our American institutions.
"All men," runs the Declaration of Independence, "are created equal * * *
endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; * * among these
* * life, liberty and pursuit of happiness." And expressing the same thought
in more precise language, the Constitution
of this Commonwealth, in its first article,
declares that "All men are born equally
free and independent, and have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights''-among
them the right of life and liberty, of
property, of individual conscience, and
the pursuit of happiness, each in his own
way. Nowhere, throughout the organic
law of our land, or of this state, is there
any recognition of the power or right of
any community or association of men to
control the freedom or conscience of "the
individual, or except for purely public
purposes his estate, or to assume to act
for him in his relations towards his fellow
citizens, or to administer his rights or obligations as an individual towards them
or the state. Nowhere, throughout the
organic law is there any recognition of
aggregations of men, of collective interests,
of artificial persons as sources or wielders
of political or social power. Everywhere
the individual, the freeman, is the acknowledged responsible political and moral
unit. To him are extended the guarantees
of the Declaration of Rights, to him the
personal elective franchise, to him the
powers of legislation through his representatives, to him the attributes and obligations of sovereignty in the exercise of
his assured prerogatives. That a structure
built upon such a foundation cannot remain unimpaired, that an organism
thus devised cannot continue to function
healthily, if its underlying conditions be
radically altered, goes without saying. A
state, a society, a government resting upon
and contrived to ensure the personal liberty and responsibility of the individuals
composing its citizenship, must inevitably
lose its character, purpose and stay if that
personal liberty be renounced and that
personal responsibility repudiated by its
citizens. The American citizen who surrenders his right of conscience into the

keeping of any aggregation of men, call it
what you will, and who yields up to it his
freedom of personal action, his right to
enjoy his property and the inestimable
privilege of pursuing his own happiness in
his own way, or who seeks to impose such
sacrifices upon others, lays the axe at the
root of American institutions. The right
of individual liberty, of self-determination,
and the idea of individual responsibility
are correlative conceptions. The one implies the duty of exercising and conceding
to others the freedom of exercising the
right so carefully reserved and safeguarded to all; and the other implies culpability in a failure to exercise it, and in
obstructing its exercise, as well as in a
wrongful exercise of it: and neither that
duty nor that responsibility can be shifted
to a third person or any association of
persons.
Let me restate this cardinal truth, and
surely no one will be found to dispute it:
our civilization, our American institutions
are founded upon the recognition of the
individual as the unit of the state afid of
society, and upon the assumption that he
is a free and responsible agent, at liberty
and bound to act as such within the law.
and that government is instituted to
secure and protect him and all his fellows
in the peaceful and equal and most ample
possible enjoyment of all their rights as
freemen. What an illogical and purposeless thing would be a system thus grounded
and designed if in the place of individual
and morally responsible units, natural
men with consciences and votes, there
should be substituted, directly or indirectly, associated interests, artificial persons, morally irresponsible aggregations,
whether incorporated or unincorporated,
not recognized by the fundamental law
as endowed with any function in its
administration! For such a state of things
the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of this State were never
intended to provide. For such a condition
they were most ill-adapted. They were
made for freemen, who feel the dignity of
their manhood, who value the liberties
secured to them personally, who have the
courage to live and act according to the
dictates of their own consciences, who
concede the same rights to all others,
and who act in the realization of their
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responsibility for the use and non-use of
their privileges. They were never made
for men who would sell their birthright for a mess of pottage,-who would
hand over their property to be managed
and juggled with by others,-who would
abdicate their consciences and yield blind
obedience to the commqnds of virtual dictators by whatever names they may be
known,-who would vote to order without
question as to right or wrong.-and who
would sneak out of their responsibilities
as individual members of society and
citizens in a free country by pleading the
behests of their chosen associates or selfimposed masters.
Nor is the attitude of such any less repugnant to the mission of Christianity.
If there is any one thing about our coinmon religion more unmistakable than any
other, it is that its injunctions and its inhibitions are addressed to each individual
as an individual. The duties it enjoins
are personal duties; the responsibilities it
imposes are personal responsibilities; the
comforts it brings, the promises it holds
out, it offers to each as an individual, to
each by himself. Its message is to you
personally. No one can receive it for you,
no one can answer it for you. By your
own acts are you judged, and your own
conscience, not that of any other, must in
every instance be your justification or
your condemnation.
Now, as I have indicated, the associative tendency of our age leads to the substitution of a sort of collective conscience
in the place of the individual conscience,the acceptance of principles prevalent in
one's surroundings in the place of independent appeals to one's own judgment of
right and wrong. In a measure that
tendency is irresistible; but there are
limits to one's right to yield to it, quos
ultra citroque nequit consistere rectum.
I have endeavored to show that, after all,
individual liberty and conscience are at
the very foundation of our institutions,
and that they cannot be renounced without damage to the latter, or at least impairment of their usefulness. The young
gentlemen who are about to go forth from
this institution will presently be called
upon to take an oath, in entering upon the
office of attorney-at-law. They will be
called upon to swear that they will sup-

port the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of the State to which
they belong. Let them remember that
the duty they will thus assume implies
the maintenance in all surroundings of
their independence as responsible and selfdetermining men, and the concession to
all others of the like character and freedom
of action, and forbids them to suffer either
their own consciences and liberties to be
supplanted or those of others to be subjugated by any set of associates, busiuess,
social or professional. Far be it from me
to counsel any young man to devote himself to the ungrateful vocation of the
chronic obstructionist or reformer, or to
imitatein life that nuisance in the administration. of the law, the over-wise twelfth
juror who rails at the density of the remaining eleven because they will not concur with him. There is upon every doubtful question-and there are few that have
not two sides-a presumption that the
many who agree are right and that the
few who lisagree are wrong. And hence,
in one's professional activity, in one's
business relations, in one's social affairs,
in one's religious connections, in politics,
it is ordinarily fair to assume and to act
upon the assumption that a difference of
opinion, if tried with perfect impartiality
and to the end, would be resolved in favor
of the great majority. But in every
man's life there arise occasions when he is
put to the choice of doing or assenting to
what is clearly wrong and thereby conforming to the wishes of those with whom
his interests lie or whom he desires to
oblige, or of declining to join in with
them. In these trying situations the
highest obligation of American manhood
demands the assertion of the dignity of
the individual and of his sovereign independence,- a peremptory refusal to abdicate one's judgment in favor of others,and a sturdy insistence upon the inalienable right to follow the dictates of one's
own conscience. There is clearly perceptible in our day a growing disposition to
shirk this duty and to obscure the great
principle out of which it arises. In politics we hear much of the need of so-called
regularity, the requirement, under pain of
ostracism, to subscribe unquestioningly to
the doctrines propounded and to support
unhesitatingly the candidates and meas-
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ures proposed by the party organization.
In the great and in the small business
combinations of latter years, the dogma of
solidarity of interests is not only preached
to willing ears with alluring plausibility,
but pushed to the extreme of justifying
the crushing out of those who will not fall
in line. In the world of labor, the determination of the right and nature of man's
employment, of the compensation to be
accepted in return, of the quality and extent of services to be rendered, of the
choice of the persons to whom and of those
in whose company they are to be rendered,
and of the precise moment and cause and
period of their cessation, is gradually being withdrawn from the individual and
lodged in the hands of organizations. In
these and other departments of modern
life, the common effort is to absorb the individual in the mass, to obliterate individual discretion, individual endeavor,
individual responsibility. And yet it may
be safely assumed that all of those prominently engaged in this effort, as well as
the vast majority of those following their
leadership, are at heart patriotic American
citizens. Led to see that the spirit they
are fostering is essentially subversive of
American institutions and akin to that
which made shipwreck of the ancient
commonwealths,-hardly one of them but
would shudder at the thought. And who
shall be bold enough, or pessimistic enough
to doubt that a thorough realization of the
same truth by the American people generally will avail to call into action such conservative and patriotic energies within the
movement itself now going on, as will
suffice to give it a direction and impose
upon it a moderation which will safeguard the nation against permanent evil
-consequences and hasten its happy issue
out of this period of transition?
Those to whom I am speaking, with an
earnestness I wish it were in my power to
make more impressive, are but a handful
in the vast throng. Those to whom I am
more especially addressing these concluding words are but a few young men, without influence and without experience.
But they are going out in the service of a
noble profession, which will bring them
into close communion with all sorts and
conditions of men, and with every department of life. Let no man weakly imagine

that because he is but one in a multitude
his power is nothing, The great and beneficent achievements in the world's history have invariably been accomplished
by individuals, and not by numbers. True,
it is idle to measure the strength of the
average man with that of the Anakim of
our race. But to us and to many, cast in
a humbler mould, it is spoken, for the
strengthening of hearts, that as "not a
sound has ever ceased to vibrate through
space, not a ripple has ever been lost upon
the ocean,-much more is it true that not a
true thought, nor a pure resolve, nor a
loving act, has ever gone forth in vain."
Let me then urge upon you, young gentlemen, that as you pursue your lifework in the world, hastelessly and tirelessly bending to it your utmost energies,
deferring to the judgment of your surroundings in all matters in which your
own reason and conscience do not clearly
furnish an infallible guide, you nevertheless steadfastly keep before your eyes your
dignity, your independence, your responsibility as individuals. Be not yourselves
"dumb, driven cattle," neither permit
others to be made such, but do what in
you lies to impress all you can reach with
a realizing sense of the importance of that
principle so vital to our civilization and so
tenderly guarded by our fundamental
law, the principle of individual liberty
and responsibility. It is not a mere bit of
constitutional bric-a-brac. It is a living
and a present and a sacred thing, which
can never be lost without grievous detriment to humanity. Of that principle the
American people by its Constitution has
avowed itself the standard-bearer among
the nations of the earth. See to it that
your solemn promise to support the Constitution prove not a hollow form through
heedlessness of that Which lies at the very
bottom of it.
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EXPLANATORY.
The chief object of the publication of the
FORuM, is to embody in it a portion of the
work of the Moot Court. Ashort account
of the method pursued is here given.
Two students are selected as counsel on
each side. A fifth student acts as judge.
The case having been submitted by some
member of the Faculty, the counsel investigate the law, prepare briefs and at an
appointed time, make their oral arguments.
The judge considers the case, and prepares
If counsel are dissatisfied
an opinion.
with this opinion, they appeal to the Dean.
The decision is then reviewed, and is affirmed, modified or reversed.
The FoRum contains the cases stated, a
condensation of the briefs of counsel, the
opinion of the student judge, and, when
there has been an appeal, the opinion of
the appellate judge, a member of the
Faculty.
Probably 120 appeals were heard during
the school year just closed. Some of the
cases have appeared in each of the monthly
numbers (nine are issued annually). No
other Law School offers so large a practice
of the sort indicated; nor do the journals
published by Law Schools generally embody its results. In this respect, the FoRum
is, among Law School journals, unique..
No other publishes the work done within
the school. Experience shows that the
fact that the briefs and opinions of the students are to be printed, deepens their interest in the writing and preparation of
them, and leads to greater thoroughness
and care.
The June number ot the FoRum contains
an account of the events attending the
Commencement together with the Baccalaureate Address of the Hon. Gustav A.
Endlich, which will be found on page 197.
We may add thatthe FORUm is published
by the students of the School, through a
committee of editors and business managers.
THE EDITORS.

MOOT COURT.
MUSSER vs. MUSSER.
Will- Interpretation- Die
without legal issue-Definitefailure of
issue-Act of July 9, 1897.

j'ectment -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

I, Henry B. Musser, of the borough of
Camp Hill, make this my last will and
testament:
* * *"
First* * *
Second* * *
Third* * *
FourthFifth-I give and bequeath to my son,
Henry S. Musser, my homestead where I
now live and the lot of ground fronting on
Chestnut Street in said borough and all
my personal property and my five acres of
land in York County.
If my son, Henry Musser, should die
without legal issue then all I have bequeathed to him shall revert to my legal
heirs.
The will was dated 11th Nov., 1897.
Testator's other children were Sarah and
Amos. Henry has died having two children, both of whom are dead. His widow
survives. This ejectment by Sarah and
Amos against the widow.
CORE and EBBERT for the plaintiff.
Action is brought by the right parties.
Legal heirs is equivalent to heirs-at-law.
Bugby's Appeal, 61 Pa. 116. The intention was to express a definite failure of
Taylor v. Taylor, 63 Pa. 483;
issue.
Eichelberger v. Barnitz, 9 Watts 447;
Findley v. Riddle, 3 Binney 139; Shea's
Est., 9 Phila. 354: Bentby v. Kaufman, 3
W. N. C. 352; Middleworth v. Blackman,
74 Pa. 414; Mitchell v. R. R. Co., 165 Pa.
645; Pierce v. Hubbard, 152 Pa. 18; Miller's
Est., 105 Pa. 561; Subert v. Butz, 9 Watts
490.
Henry S. Musser took a defeasible fee.
Montgomery v: Petriken, 29 Pa. 118;
Dombough v. McNeal, 61 Pa. 73.
MownY and PH-iIPS for the defendant.
The widow of a tenant in fee, which fee
is determined by the death of the tenant
without issue, is entitled to dower in the
estate thus determined. Lovett v. Lovett,
10 Phila. 537; Evans v. Evans, 9 Pa. 190;
Buchanan v. McCallister, 2 Yeates, 373;
Taylor v. Taylor, 67 Pa. 281.
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Collateral heirs cannot maintain ejectment against a widow in possession of
land of which her husband died seised.
Gourley v. Kinley, 66 Pa. 270; Seider v.
Seider, 5 Wharton 508.
OPINION OP THE COURT.

Henry B. Musser provided in the fifth
clause of his will as follows: "I give and
bequeath to my son Henry S. Musser, my
homestead where I now live and the lot of
ground fronting on Chestnut street in said
borough and all my personal property and
my five acres of land in York county."
This clause we think is sufficient, under
the act of April 8,1833; P. & L. 1446, which
makes it unnecessary to use words of limitation, to give Henry S. Musser a fee
simple.
But the testator further provided that,
"If my son, Henry S. Musser, should die
without legal issue then all I have bequeathed to him shall revert to my legal
heirs."
The question now arises what effect does
this last clause have on the former? The
testator has used the words "die without
legal issue," which we think has exactly
thesame meaning as "die without issue,"
which has been construed to mean an indefinite failure of issue, unless there is
something in the will which indicates an
intention of the testator that the words,
"die without issue," shall not mean "issue
indefinitely," but children when this construction does not apply. But in the case
at bar, there is nothing in the will which
shows such an intention. Therefore, we
conclude that according to the common
law, the testator must have intended to
create an estate tail in his son, Henry.
Eichelberger v. Barnitz, 9 Watts 447; Hill
v. Hill, 74 Pa. 173; Taylor v. Taylor, 63 Pa.
481. It was unnecessary for testator to say
it should revert to his legal heirs, because
it would have gone to them without him
so designating. Henry S. Musser thus got
an estate tail under the will, which by the
act of April 27, 1855, Sec. 1, P. & L. 1882,
was enlarged into a fee simple.
Henry S. Musser died leaving a widow
and two children. We presume the children died since Henry, because the facts
state that he died having children. The
widow is therefore entitled to the possession of the land, as to three-thirds for life
as being the mother of the children who
died without issue. She is also entitled to

a life estate in one-third of it as widow of
her husband, but this is merged into the
life estate in the whole. Robert's Appeal,
39 Pa. 417; act of May 25, 1887, Sec. 2, P.
L. 161.
Judgment for defendant.
GROSS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMXE COURT.

The devise to Henry would have given
a fee, but for the clause "If
my son,
Henry, should die without legal issue,
then all I have bequeathed to him shall
revert to my legal heirs." The words
"without legal issue" must be understood
to mean, "without legal issue surviving
him." To have had issue that died before Henry, would not prevent the taking
effect of the ulterior limitation.
Henry has had two children, but they
have died before him. He is survived by
his widow alone.
The phrase of limitation "without legal
issue" must be understood, since the passage of the act of July 9, 1897, P. L. 213, to
point to a definite failure of issue, and to
create a conditional limitation. It follows
that the event has happened upon which
the land is, according to the terms of the
will, to "revert to my legal heirs."
Ordinarily a widow has a dower in a fee
of her husband subject to a conditional
limitation, notwithstanding that that fee
has determined at his death. Evans v.
Evans, 9 Pa. 190. In M'Masters v. Negley, 152 Pa. 303, a distinction is drawn
between a devise over, on failure of issue,
and a direction that the land shall
"revert," and as a part of the residuary
estate be divided among those who would
take under the intestate law; a distinction
which is said to be exceedingly refined.
Be it noticed that the direction there
was that on the death of a child, childless,
under the age of twenty-five years, the
share of such child should become part of
the residuary estate, and be, as such,
divided as under the intestate law. The
limitation was practically a condition
subsequent with reverter to heirs.
It
was held that on the death of a daughter,
under twenty-five years and without surviving children, her husband would not
have courtesy. Had the devisee been a
son, a similar limitation could have precluded dower in his wife.
The direction in the Musser will is that,
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on death without legal issue, the land
shall "revert to my legal heirs." We
must conclude that the widow of Henry
took no dower. The provision is substantially a condition subsequent with
reverter on breach of it.
It follows that the plaintiff shoulci have
been permitted to recover the whole land.
It is but fair to the learned judge who
wrote the opinion in the court below to
say, that, if the fact were, as he assumed,
that Henry, the testator's son, left two
children to survive him, the limitation
over, or the direction for "reverting"
could not take effect. The failure of issue
contemplated, viz: that if Henry at his
death, not occurring, an unconditional fee
vested in his children, subject to a dower
in his widow. On the subsequent death
of these children, their mother, the widow,
took the land for her life, and Sarah and
Amos, the brother and. sister of Henry,
took the fee in reversion. It would follow
that, during the widow's life, she, and
not they, would be entitled to the possession.
Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.
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WRIGHT and CORE for plaintiff.
Itis the duty of a municipality to furnish
necessaries to its inhabitants who are quarantined during a small pox siege. Zellner
v. Allentown, 5 Disct. Rep. 547;84Pa. 487.
HAMBLIN and VASTiNE for defendants.
In this case the municipality did not
create the debt, and the liability to pay it
is not upon it. Darbymple v. Wilkesbarre,
2 Kulp 39. Municipality is liable only
when patients are unable to pay. Gill v.
Appamoose County, 68 Iowa 20; 1 Phila.
20. The essentials of contract are absent
nnd therefore municipality cannot be held.
Zellner v. Allentown, 18 Pa. C. C. 162.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

On the trial of this case we were not assisted materially by the citation of cases,
by reason of the fact that in Pennsylvania
there have been but few cases adjudicated
relative to the question involved. Nevertheless the court apprehends no doubt as
to what the decision should be.
Briefly the facts are as follows: During
a small pox siege about nine families were
segregated besides the several cases then
existing. The Board of Health directed
the usual guard of ropes and watchmen.
Supplies were furnished the families by
grocers being permitted to come up to the
JONES vs. BOROUGH OF SILVER
ropes and take the orders either personBROOK.
ally or through the guards. It appears
Liability of municipal corporations-Im- that the Board of Health did not direct
the goods to be bought on their credit nor
plied contract.
did they intimate that they would pay, if
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
the same were not paid for by the individDuring a small pox siege, about nine uals. It further appears that all the famfamilies were segregated besides the sev- ilies were able to pay their bills. On these
eral cases then existing. The usual guard facts the plaintiff seeks to recover the
of ropes and watchmen were placed by amount of his bill from the borough, withorder of The Board of Health. The dif- out first attempting to collect from the inferent families were supplied by various dividuals. It requires only a cursory readgrocers who were permitted to come up to ing of the facts to establish that if the
the ropes and take orders personally or plaintiff can recover it must be on a contract, either express or implied. We are
through the guards.
The delivery of the goods was made in the unable to discover any of the elements of a
same way. At no time did the Board of contract in the case at bar. We see no
Health order the goods bought on their ground for assumpsit. The borough ascredit or say that if they were not paid sumned nothing. No contractual relation
existed between the borough and the plainthey would do that.
tiff. We are of the opinion that if the
All are able to pay their bills. Jones,
one of the grocers, now brings an action of borough were obligated to support these
assumpsit against the borough for the families they had the right to designate
goods that he furnished several of the the grocers who should furnish the supplies, and they did not so designate the
families. He has never made any effort
plaintiff.
to collect the same from the individuals.
The plaintiff relies chiefly on the case of
Is the borough liable? Can Jones reZellner v. Allentown, reported in 5 D. R.
cover?
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547. The facts in that case and the present one are somewhat analogous. The
court allowed a recovery in the former.
Notice, however, that that case differs
from the one at bar in two material features. 1. The individuals were unable to
pay their bills. 2. An agent of the municipality contracted with the plaintiff to
furnish the supplies.
Whether ornota borough would beliable
for supplies furnished, when it appeared
that the individuals were unable to pay for
the same, need not be considered by this
court as that question is not involved in
the present suit. Personally I would incline to the opinion that even under such
conditions, the borough could not be held
unless they designated the grocers who
were to furnish the supplies. The law of
Iowa is contra.
We have already considered the second
point of difference in the two cases, viz.:
that of contract. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that the facts in this case are not
sufficient to establish assumpsit against
the borough. The action should have been
brought against the individuals.
KRESS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

Had the Board of Health, in the exercise of lawful authority, so completely
segregated the families afflicted with
small pox, as to prevent access to them by
purveyors of food and other necessaries,
it would have probably been its duty to
furnish food to them, and had it, in the
exercise of this duty, obtained food from
Johns, it or the borough would probably
have been liable to pay him. The Board
of Health did not do these things. The
isolation of the afflicted families was not
so complete that they had no access to
grocers. It is ascertained that the grocers
came up to the ropes, and took orders from
the occupants of the houses, directly or
indirectly through the guards. The grocers, therefore, sold to the householders,
as they would have done, had there been
no obstruction to intercourse by the latter
with the world. Why then should these
householders not pay for what they
bought? And why should the grocers be
paid by.others than the persons to whom
they sold?
It does not appear that anything sold,
would not have been needed and bought,

but for the quarantine. We can imagine
no valid reason for the substitution as
debtor, of the borough, which did not
buy, nor make buying necessary, for the
householders who did buy, and who must
have bought, had their commerce with
society been not at all restrained.
Perhaps the restriction upon their intercourse, lessened or suspended the earning
power of the householder, and consequently, his ability to pay the grocer. It does
not appear, however, that he was earning
any thing before the establishment of the
quarantine, or whether, if he was, he
earned less after it, and in consequence of
it. But, had these facts appeared, it
could not be inferred from them that the
Board of Health or the borough was liable
for the price of the things sold, unless it
also appeared that the consequence of
them was that no grocer would sell anything to the householder upon his sole
credit.
It is not necessary to consider whether
persons who have suffered loss from a
quarantine, may obtain redress from the
authority which established it. Many
unremunerated sacrifices have to be made
for the state. When misfortune sends a
contagious disease on a man, he does not
have to be paid for refraining, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion, from
communicating it to his fellow-man. He
must bear the consequent isolation, as he
bears the disease. But, even if the secluded householder had a right to indemnity from the borough the measure of.
this indemnity would not be the price of
the food he ate duiing the solitude, nor is
there any kind of subrogation under
which the grocer could take the place of
the secluded, in a suit against the Board of
Health or the borough.
We are aware of no authority that
would sustain such a right, and it would
needs be exceptionally eminent to convince us of the existence of such a right.
The facts of Zellner v. Allentown, 5 D. R.
547, are different toto coelo from those of
the case before us.
Judgment affirmed.
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A material alteration in any negotiable instrumentbythepromiseeorholder, without
the promisor's knowledge, extinguishes
Alteration of a non-negotiable instrument all liability upon the instrument as against
-Endorser not liable thereon-Liability the non-consenting promisor. Wood v.
of such endorser.
Steel, 6 Wal. U. S. 80; Neff v. Hqrner,
63 Pa. 327; Marshall v. Gougler 10 S. &
STATEmIRNT OF THE CASE.
R. 164; Wheelock v. Freeman, 13 Pick.
A note made by Henry Drummond and Mass. 165.
payable to Ormrod,read thus: "Six months
On the trial of this cause in the lower
from date I will pay John Ormrod five court, it was proved by Ormrod that the
hundred dollars. Value received. This last sentence of the note-"This note to
note to be renewed for three months."
be renewed for three months"-was not on
When the note was presented to the bank
it when he sold it to Samuel Tombs. Now,
for discount, the words "more at six per the William Penn Bank proves that it
cent discount" were scored. Ormrod had was on the note when it bought it from
sold the note after endorsing it to Samuel Tombs. Here we have oath against oath,
Tombs, who had caused it to be discounted.
anu to support the testimony of the bank
Ormrod proved that the last sentence on
we have the written instrument. Therethe note, "This note to be renewed for fore, the presumption is that the senthree months," was noi on it when he sold tence-"This note to be renewed for three
it to Tombs. The bank proves it was on
months"-was on it at the time the bank
when it bought the note.
purchased it. Hence, the bank was an inLouRIMER and RENO for the plaintiff.
noeent purchaser for value, but this does
Assignor impliedly warrants that note not make Ormrod any the more liable.
is valid, and is therefore liable to his as- He proves that when he sold the note to
signee. Sarah v. Wess, 1 W. & S. 153; Samuel Tombs it was not on it, and now
Flynn v. Allen, 57 Pa. 482. Bank is bound
to know signature of drawer. 7 L. R. A. Tombs remains silent, and there is not a
537.
particle of evidence as to whether or not
MoRGAN and Coos for the defendant.
Tombs himself put the added words.
A material alteration without consent of Have we a right to say that Ormrod put
the maker or endorser avoids the note as these words there, or that it was a part of
to them. Hanby v. Carboz, 150 Pa. 23;
which Tombs purNeff v. Homer, 63 Pa. 327; Craighead v. the consideration upon
McLane, 35 Pa. 80. Note in suit is non- chased the note from Ormrod, or that he
negotiable. Act of 1901, P. L. 194.
authorized Tombs to put it there? We
think we have not. The rule that where
OPINION OF THE COURT.,
two innocent persons must suffer,
We are called upon to decide whether one of
has put it in the power of another
who
he
nea
is
controversy
in
note
this
or not
wrong must bear the loss, and
the
do
to
gotiable instrument. If it is negotiable, it
of commercial paper taken
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the
that
recover
to
plaintiff
the
for
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faith
good
in
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after
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little
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fabrication,
complete
unauthorized material alteration of deeds
one as the other. The
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of a note after it
securities
the
regards
law
constant and essential uses to which neforgery with respect
entier
an
as
altered
is
obvious
is
it
put,
are
gotiable instruments
the parties who have not consented and
that even more dangerous consequences to
far agsthey are concerned deals with it
so
altowards
leniency
a
would flow from
But, we must not drift too
accordingly.
terations in them than in deeds. This
vital point in this case.
most
the
from
far
United
the
by
only
not
attitude is assumed
It is argued by the learned counsel for the
States Supreme Court, butby the Supreme
that this is not a negotiable inCourts of nearly every State in the Union. plaintiff,
WM. PENN BANKvs. JOHN
ORMROD.
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strument within the meaning and intent
of the Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 194. This
act declares that an instrument shall not
be negotiable unless made payable to order
or to bearer. This note read: "Six months
from date I will pay John Ormrod $500."1
The *ording of the obligation specifically
specifies whom he is to pay the money to.
It uses neither of the words of the statue,
"to order" or "to bearer," or words that
could be construed to mean the same. We
have not been able to find a single case
under the Negotiable Instrument Act of
1901 questioning its constitutionality. We
are, therefore, of the opinion that this note
was not negotiable and must, therefore,
stand good as against the first maker.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
WILCox, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The note was a promise to pay John
Ormrod $500; not John Ormrod, or order,
or bearer. There was no promise for the
substitution of a new payee. The Act relating to Negotiable Instruments, of May
16, 1901, P. L. 194, declares "that an instrument, to be negotiable, must conform
to the following requirements, 1st * * *,
I, 4th, Must be
2d - - *, 3d . .
payable or order or to bearer." Such was
the law prior to its enactment. Hence,
the note in suit was not negotiable. The
direction in section 124 of the act, supra,
P. L., 1901, 211, that "where a negotiable
instrument is materially altered without
the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is
avoided except," etc., is, therefore, irrelevant.
The suit is against Ormrod, and the only
ground on which a recovery against him
is sought, is that he endorsed the note.
He did endorse the note to Tombs, and
Tombs later endorsed it to the plaintiff
bank. But, it is quite well settled that a
mere endorsement by a payee or other
party of a non-negotiable note imposes no
ocDaniel,
liability upon him. Shaffstall v.
152 Pa. 598; Woods v. North, 84 Pa. 407;
14 P. & L. Dig. 23472. Ormrod is, therefore, without liability, whether the alleged
alteration was or was not made after he
had endorsed.
It is proved that the words "This note
to be renewed for three months," etc., were
not on the note when Ormrod endorsed It
to Tombs and that they were on It when

Tombs endorsed it to the William Penn
Bank. These words materially alter the
note, and discharge prior parties to it who
did not assent in the insertion of them, u nless there was negligence in the formation
of the note, which made possible the alteration of it in such way as not to awaken
the suspicion of a reasonably observant
subsequent purchaser of it. There are no
facts developed that disclose any such
Because of the alteration,
negligence.
therefore, Ormrod would be discharged,
even were he otherwise liable. 8 Randolph, Com. Paper, 856, (lst Ed.).
We are not able to understand some of
the reasoning of the learned court below,
but what of it we do understand, would
seem to conduct to a judgment, not for
the plaintiff, but for the defendant. Ours
has conducted us to a decision in favor of
the defendant.
Judgment reverspd.
WM. FLOOD vs. CHAS. GOSSART.
Conditionalsale--Recvery in replevinfor
condition broken-Assumpsit on the contract barred by recoveryl in replevin.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Flood sold to Gossart a horse, stipulating for payment after delivery of possession, and that the horse should remain
Flood's until paid for. The price was
$250.
Gossart obtained the horse but never
paid the price though six months had
elapsed; whereupon, Flood recovered the
possession by an action of replevin. He
now sues in assumpsit for the purchase
money, after having offered to deliver the
horse on payment.
Yocum and CHAPMAN for the plaintiff.
The property did not pass by delivery in
view of the condition. Buy. on Sales, 6th
Am. Ed. 359; Haak v. Linderman, 64 Pa.
499; Stadtfeld v. Huntsman, 92 Pa. 53;
Martin v. Mathiat, 14 S. & R. 214. The
conditional sale was binding between the
parties. Fasdick v. Scholl, 99 U. S. 235,
250; Swallow v. Emery, 111 Mass. 355. A
former judgment operates as an estoppel,
only when for the same cause of action.
Carmery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. 80; Schriver v.
Eckenrod, 87 Pa. 213; Cist v. Zeigler, 16
S. & R. 284; Tams v. Lewis, 42 Pa. 410.
HUBLER and FLEITZ for the defendant.
For negligence to accept and pay for
goods, the seller may recover damages-
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further litigation, for the evidence to
support both actions is the same, that
being so, the cause of action is the
same notwithstanding the actions are
grounded on different writs. Marsh v.
Pier, 4 Rawl 284. The judgment following
the action of replevin would be conclusive
OPINION OF THE COURT.
evidence in every other species of action;
This case presents a difficult question for
the verdict would be a bar to the action of
solution. Does an act of replevin for a
assumpsit-call it estoppel or conclusive
horse sold on condition, bar an action of
evidence, the effect would be the same.
assumpsit for the purchase price of the
Ziegler v. Ziegler, 2 S. & R. 286; Garvan v.
same, after it has been replevied for conDawson, 13 S. & R. 248; Estep v. Hutchidition broken ?
son, 14 S & R. 437; Cist v. Ziegler, 16 S. &
The stipulation was for payment in three
R. 286; Long v. Long, 5 Watts 102.
months after the delivery of possession,
For the above reasons judgment is enand that the horse should remain the
tered for the defendant.
plaintiff's until paid for.
CORE, J.
This was a conditional sale, and as beOPINION
OF
THE
SUPREME
COURT.
tween Flood and Gossart it was valid and
The horse was to be delivered to Gossart
(binding on both, and title does not pass
prior to payment. It was in fact so deuntil the payment of the purchase money.
livered. But in three months thereafter,
Haak v. Linderman, 64 Pa. 501. In deGossart was to pay the price, $250. Until
fault of payment the plaintiff may reclaim
the horse and use civil remedies for the re- payment, the horse was to remain Flood's.
Gossart has never paid the price. Three
covery, as it was a breach of the condition
and the right of possession revests in the months after it became payable Flood recovered the possession by replevin. He
seller, and he may either replevy the horse
now sues in assumpsit for the price.
or sue to recover the value. Sampson v.
As the price was not paid when it
Hicks, 134 Pa. 666; Henderson v. Laucks,
should have been, Flood had a right to re21 Pa. 359; Hill v. Freeman, 3 Cush. 257.
scind the contract. His ownership had
The plaintiff elected to sue in replevin
not ceased, and possession is one of its
in the former action, and while it does not
incidents, unless the right thereto has by
appear that judgment was obtained in
favor of the plaintiff in the replevin suit, some agreement become separated for a
we will assume that it was; that being the time, from it. The contract separated
from it this right for the period of three
case the plaintiff was entitled to damages
months, but no longer. At the expiration
for the detention of the horse. Warner v.
of that term, Flood, the owner, could lawAugenbaugh, 15 S. & R. 9.
fully resume the possession. He might
The plaintiff having elected to replevy
the horse the remedy was complete in itself, have taken possession himself, without
the aid of the court. He chose to obtain
and if we should allow assumpsit to lie, it
that aid, through the action of replevin.
would be cumulative. The plaintiff canNow, the taking of possession is by no
not adopt both remedies unless it was
means decisive of the intention to rescind
plainly stipulated in the contract, or a necthe contract. It might be due to the
essary implication arose from its terms.
Seanor v. McLaughlin, 165 Pa. 150. Nor
opinion that, although, the contract would
does it make any difference that the plain- continue, and Gossart would be entitled
to regain possession upon payment of the
tiff offered to return the horse to Gossart,
as the contract was at an end when he re- price with interest, he had lost the right
to the possession until such payment.
covered the horse in the replevin action.
The courts, however, have chosen to inScott v. Hoyh, 151 Pa. 630.
This being the case it was res judiata. terpret it as an expression of the intention
The rule is "Nemo debet bis vezaripro torexcind. Andrewsv. Campney, 4Forum,
124 ; and cases there cited.
eadem eausa." The judgment being final
It follows, if Flood's resumption of posfor its own purpose and object consession is to be understood as a putting o'
cludes the subject matter and is a bar to
the difference between contract and market price. Tiffany on Sales, 231; Vale on
Pa. Law, 108; M'Combs v. M'Kennan, 2
W. & S. 2]6; Gaspeel v. Morris, 7 W. &S.
32; Girard v. Taggart, 5 S. & R. 18 ; Andrews v. Hoover, 8 W. 239 ; White v. Reynolds, 3 P. & W. 96.
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an end to the contract, that he can no
longer enforce that contract. His action
for the $250 is an endeavor to enforce it.
The learned court below has properly decided that he cannot succeed.
Judgment affirmed.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant, Evans, purchased a
forged transfer ofstock in the plaintiff company. He presented the transfer to the
corporation, which registered him as a
shareholder. By this registration the corporation held Evans out to the world as a
CARLISLE TELEPHONE CO. vs.
shareholder. Later, Evans transferred the
EVANS.
stock to a third party to whom the corpoCorlporations- Action against innocent ration issued a new certificate. All the
transferrerof forged transfer- Trans- parties except the forger were equally inferee, though innocent holder, liable.
nocent and acted without negligence. At
a time after the issuance of the new certifiSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
cate, the forgery was discovered, and the
The defendant, an innocent purchaser
corporation was compelled to reinstate the
of a forged transfer of stock, presented it
owner of the certificate on which the transto the plaintiff corporation, which regisfer was forged. The corporation brings
tered him as a shareholder. The defend- this action to recover an indemnity from
ant subsequently transferred the stock to
Evans. The case involves one question,
an innocent purchaser for value, to whom
and that is, can the corporation fix a liathe plaintiff issued certificates of registrability upon Evans for the presentation of
tion. Neither the plaintiff nor the dea forged transfer on which it relied, or, in
fendant were negligent. The plaintiff other words, is there an implied.
warranty
was obliged to reinstate the original holder
of title, in such a transaction? The full
of the stock, upon the discovery of the and
complete discussion of the amount, if
fraud, and now sues the defendant for an
any, which the corporation can recover.
indemnity.
It is settled beyond the shadow of a
HUBLER and CHAPMAN for the plaintiff,
doubt that the corporation was under a
The corporation is liable to the true
owner who is deprived of ownership on
duty to compensate or reinstate the origithe bonks of the company by forged trans- nal owner, (Penua. Ins. Co. v. Franklin
fers. Pratt v. M'f'g Co., 123 Msas. 110;
Ins. Co., 181 Pa. 40), and it is also well
Bank v. Field. 126 Mass. 345; PolIock v.
settled, that the corporation would be conBank, 7 N. Y. 274. But the transferee on
a forged endorsement cannot hold the fronted by the doctrine of estoppel if it
corporation liable because a transfer on
attempted to recall the certificate it issued
the books has been made on his applicato the transferee ofEvans. This brings us
tion. Brain v. Ins. Co., 42 Md. 384;
to the main question of the case.
Hambleton v. Ry. Co., 44 Md. 531.
The corporation has a right of action
A certificate of stock is a non-negotiable
against the person iuducing a transfer on
instrument in this and most of our sister
the books by means of a forged endorsestates. A stock certificate is also a chose
ment. Tel. Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S.
in action giving the right to dividends and
869.
GiLr,EsPIE and MOOREHOUSE for the a certain interest in the capital of the cordefendant.
poration. The certificate is evidence of
When the certificate was presented for
ownership. Possession of the certificate
transfer, the corporation was bound to determine its genuineness. Jarvis v. Manis, to a vendee, as possession of the stock,
hattan Beach Co., 148 N. Y. 652; Western just as possession of a bond is possession of
U. Tel. Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369.
the debt which it represents. It may now
The corporation is liable to the true
be regarded as well settled law, that a party
owner who is deprived of ownership on
the books by forged transfers. Davis v.
selling, as his own, property of which he
Bank of Eng., 2 Bing. 393; Bridgeport
is in possession, warrants the title of the
Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 30
thing sold; and if by reason of defect in
Conn. 231; Pratt v. Stanton Copper M'fg
title nothing passes the vendee may reCo., 123 Mass. 110.
cover his money though there be no
Where one of two innocent parties must
suffer from the fraud of a third, the loss
warranty, or fraud on the part of the venmust be borne by the one whose neglidor. Chief Justice Sharswood states the
gence enabled the third party to commit
law to be so in People's Bank v. Kurtz,
the fraud. Allen v. S. Boston R. Co., 5
L. R. A. 717.
99 Pa. 349. Mr. Justice Sergeant, in
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Chamley v. Dullis, 8 W. & S. 361, said:
"This doctrine (referring to that stated,
supra) is held to apply to choses in action
as well as other descriptions of personal
property, and, therefore, ifgone innocently
sells or transfers for value a bank note.
negotiable note, bond or other instrumen t,
and it turns out that this instrument is
forged, so that it is worthless in the bands
of the transferee, the latter may recover
back again the value given for it, on the
implied warranty of genuineness." While
the corporation is not a vendee, yet in
many respects, it stands in a similar position. It made the transfer relying upon
the title of Evans; and he, Evans, iiiipliedly warranted the certificate to be
his when he presented it to the corporation.
The transfer agent has a right to rely
upon this implied warranty; and if, as a
result, the corporation suffers loss, the person who misled them is liable. The telephone company is therefore entitled to
damages incurred in reinstating the original owner as a stockholder. These damages would be the value of the stock
represented by the original certificate at
the time the corporation was compelled to
reinstate the original owner, together with
the costs of the suit which compelled them
to reinstate, and also any dividends which
were declared between the time of the
registering of the transfer to Evans and
the reinstating of.the original owner, and
which were paid to Evans or any one
claiming through the forged transfer. The
true oAwner of the forged transfer could
demand payment of any dividends declared on his stock, and, if the corporation had paid them to some one else, they,
nevertheless, would be compelled to pay
them to him, since he, the true owner,
could not be deprived of his property
without his consent. These are the only
elements of the damages awarded in similar cases, reported in Bank v. Kurtz, 99
Pa. 344, and Railroad v. Richardson, 135
Mass. 473.
Itis, therefore, ordered thatjudgment be
entered for the plaintiff.

HAM,!BLIN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Evans buying, as he supposed, shares of
stock of the plaintiff company, by means
of a certificate with a power to transfer,
caused the company to register him as a

213

shareholder, and to issue to him a new
certificate. The new certificate was subsequently sold by hin to an innocent purchaser for value. The company was, therefore, bound to recognize this purchaser as a
shareholder. 2 Thompson, Corporations,
. 2.573.
The original holder of the stock was not
responsible for the forgery of his name to
the transfer. It does not appear that any
negligence of his contributed to the forgery, or to its succeeding in imposing upon
the company. The company is, therefore,
liable to him, for having assisted in transferring his shares to another. It must deliver to him an equal number of shares,
and pay him as dividends what it has
paid to other holders of the same number
of shares, or, it must pay him the value of
the shares, plus these dividends. Telegraph Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369; 2
Thompson, Corp., P 2567; Pratt v. Taun ton,
Copper Co., 123 Mass. 119; Penn'a Ins.
Co. v. Franklin Ins. Co., 181 Pa. 40.
When Evans offered the certificate with
the authority to transfer, he tacitly affirmed the genuineness of the signature to
the latter. The corporation is not like a
banker with respect to its depositors,
bound to know the signatures of its stockholders, as against one procuring its
recognition of a forged transfer. It is not
estopped by such recognition, since Evans
did not purchase the shares in reliance
thereon. Hambleton v. Central Ohio R.
R., 44 Md. 551; Brown v. Howard Ins.
Co., 42 Md. 384.
In the absence of any evidence that by
any failure earlier to detect the forgery or
to give notice of it to Evans, he would
suffer a loss which otherwise he might
have made good, by being compelled to
reimburse the company, he should be compelled to make this reimbursement. Boston & Albany R. R. Co. v. Richardson,
135 Mass. 473; 2 Thompson, Corp. 2582.
Judgment affirmed.
THEOBALD'S ESTATE.
Exceptions to final account of executor-Evidence-Interest adverse to deceased- Calling witness as on crossexamination under Act of 1887.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In the attempted surcharge of the administrator with a watch, alleged to be a
gift inter vivos to Mrs. Stilwell, on excep-
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tions to the final account of the executor,
can she, the alleged donee, be called as on
cross-examination after a receipt proven
to have been signed by her is produced by
the executor?
In the same ease, in the attempted surcharge of excessive counsel fees not rendered for the benefit of the estate, if the
attorney has been paid, can he be called
as on cross-examination ?
DELANEY and WALSI for the exceptants.
The mere fact of a witness having been
a party to a transaction with the deceased
is no ground for his exclusion unless he is
himself interested. Sheetz v. Haubest's,
exr's., 81 Pa. 100; Thompson's Appeal, 57
Pa. 175; Ferres v. Thompson, 52 Pa. 353:
The adverse party may testify, if the
title under which the executor prosecutes
or defends, was acquired subsequently to
the death of his testator. Chase v. Irvin's
Exrs., 87 Pa. 286.
Interested parties may testify in favor
of the estate. Porter v. Nelson, 22 W. N,
C. 387; Third Nat'l Bank v. Hunsicker,
8 Pa. C. C. 635: Miller v. Miller, 150 Pa.
535.
A party having an interest adverse to
the deceased is comipetent to testify against
his own interest. Weiser's Estate, 5 York 5.
LONGBOTT O and DRUmHELLER for the
executor.
Cited Section 7, Act of 1887, and Dickson v. McGraw Bros., 151 Pa. 98.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It Is arrant nonsense for counsel to ask
us to give an opinion upon a state of facts,
which is as incomplete as this. We have
decided the case by uniting into the facts
thfe inference of other facts which we have
drawn therefrom. If we did not do so,
the facts in respect to drawing a legal decision therefrom would be incomprehensible.
The Act of May 23, 1887, Sec. 7, provides: "In any civil proceedings whether
or not it be brought or defended by a person
representing the interest of a deceased or
lunatic assignor of anything or contract in
action, a party to the record or a person
for whose immediate benefit such proceeding is prosecuted, or any other person
whose interestis adverse to the party calling him as a witness, may be compelled by
the adverse party to testify as if under
cross-examination."
Is the donee's interest "adverse to the
party calling him as a witness '" ? If not,
the donee cannot be called to testify as on
cross-examination.

The gift was made in the lifetime of the
deceased, fully executed and a receipt was
given by the donee to the deceaed in his
lifetime. Even if the case should go
against the executor lie could have no
action against the donee, the gift being
fully executed.
For the same reason
neither could the heirs recover the gift
from the donee. Therefore, if no right or
privilege of the donee is affected by this
suit, he is not a party interested. The
case of Dixon v. McGraw, 151 Penn. 98, is
in point. Mrs. Dickson's laud was sold
in execution to McGraw, and subsequently
on another execution to Mary Dickson.
In an ejectment by Mary Diekson against
the grantee of McGraw, now dead, Mrs.
Dickson and her husband could prove
that the first sale was upon a fraudulent
judgment and for that reason void. The
court said: "The witness not only had no
'adverse interest' but had no interest
whatever in the event of suit, and were,
therefore, competent witnesses." It follows then that the donee has no interest
adverse to the party who intends to call
him to testify as on cross-examination.
Therefore, in this case he cannot be called
as on cross-examination and compelled to
testify.
Unless by order of court an executor
has no right to pay counsel fees, which
were not. rendered for the benefit of the
estate. If the professional services are
rendered for a person interested in the
estate and not for the benefit of the estate,
the executor will not be allowed credit for
such fees. Reeser's Estate, 100 Penn. 79.
There is no evidence of collusion between
the executor and the attorney. Regardless of a refunding bond, if any was given
by the attorney, the executor could recover from the attorney the money which
was not legally due him from the estate,
and which had been paid by the executor
through a mistake of fact. However, in
case the executor is not surcharged for
such payment, he could not recover from
the attorney. Hence, it is clear that the
attorney is interested in the case to the
extent of not havilig the executor surcharged. His interest is adverse to the
exceptants. As the exceptants have called
him, it follows that he is a "person whose
interest is adverse to the party calling
him as a witness." The result is that in
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accordance with the provisions of the Act
of May 293,1887, the exceptants may call
and compel him "to testify as if under
cross-examination."
COOPER,J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Of the exceptions to the account of the
administrator of this estate, one charges
that excessive fees have been paid by him
to counsel. These fees have been paid.
Nothing appears from which it may be
legitimately inferred that they, or any part
of them, could be recovered back. The exceptant called him, but wished, treating him as a hostile witness, to be free
from responsibiliky for his testimony, and
to be allowed to examine him by leading
questions.
The testimony was, so far as appears,
concerning events that have occurred
since the death of Theobald. The attorney
is, therefore, entirely competent to testify
for the exceptant or the accountant. Indeed, were he a claimant in person, he
would be competent to support his demand
by his own testimony. Section 6, of the
Act of 'May 23d, 1887, euacts that "Any
person who is incompetent under clause
(e) of section five by reason of interest,
may nevertheless be called to testify
against his interest," etc. But the attorney is not incompetent under clause (e).
Section 7, of the act of 1887, declares
that in any civil proceeding, whether the
estate of a deceased or lunatic person is or
is not involved, any person "whose interest is adverse to the party calling him
as a witness, may be compelled by the adverse party to testify as if under crossexamination." By this section, if the attorney is interested adversely to the exceptant, lie can be called for crossexamination.
We cannot understand from the language of this section, that any kind of
interest will subject to this mode of examination.
The common law did not
allow calling all persons who from friendship for one party, or hostility to another,
from interest in a similar question, or
otherwise, had or might be presumed to
have a bias against the party proposing to
call them, without responsibility and for
cross-examination. We do not understand
the 7th section to change the law in this respect. Nobody can be called by a party
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for cross-examination, not having been first
called by the opposite party-unless it is
apparent that he is legally interested in the
decision which his testimony will assist
to frame. Will he share in the sum recovered? Will the defeat of the plaintiff
save him, or as evidence tend to save him,
from a liability to lose money or other
property? If he has a desire for the success of party B, which is not grounded in
the possibility of his own pecuniary or
proprietary gain, or avoidance of loss by
result of the controversy in which he testifies, such desire does not make him a person
"whose interest is adverse." Theattorney
will gain no money that he has not already
gained, nor lose money that lie has, if
the accountant prevails, and the exceptant
fails. Hence, he is not to be called by the
latter, as for cross-examination, unless
and until he has been called and examined
by the former.
It seems to have been thought, at the
audit, that if the attorney had received
compensation for services not rendered to
the estate, but to the administrator, individually, or if he had received excessive
compensation for services rendered to the
estate, he could be compelled to pay back
to the estate, in the former case, all that
he had received, and, in the latter case,
the excess beyond a fair compensation.
But why so? The money he got was not,
specifically, a portion of the estate. The
administrator has paid him so much, and
now asks to be reimbursed from the
estate. Unless the attorney gave a refunding bond, or in some way agreed that
if the administrator failed, at the audit, to
charge the estate with the amount paid,
he would repay, he is at no risk.
His
testimony tends to save him from no pecuniary loss.
The accountant has omitted to charge
himself with a gold watch, once the
property of the deceased. The excuse for
so doing is, that prior to death, the deceased gave it mortis causa to Sarah Stilwell. The executor produces a receipt
from Mrs. Stilwell, and it is tacitly ad.
mitted that she has in fact received the
watch. If it clearly appeared that she
could not, whatever the result of this controversy, be compelled to deliver the
watch back, she could have no visible interestin it. Hence, she could not be called
for cross-examination.
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As the watch is conceded to have been
the property of the decedent, if it continued such until his death, it is improperly withheld by Mrs. Stilwell. She
can be compelled to deliver it, either by
an action by the administrator, or. by a
decree of the Orphans' Court, which has
jurisdiction over those who wrongfully
have and retain possession of a dead
man's assets. Watt's Estate, 158 Pa. 1;
Brook's Appeal, 102 Pa. 150; Odd Fellows' Savings Bank's Appeal, 123 Pa. 356.
Will she be protected from this liability
by a decree in favor of the administrator
in the proceeding before us?
The defense of the administrator is, not
that he has been unable to recover the
watch, although it is unjustly detained,
but, solely, that it is the property of Mrs.
Stilwell. The exception denies this, and
the exceptants have undertakefi to support the denial. We are inclined to think,
that (though Mrs. Stilwell, if not called
on to defend, would not be bound by the
decree against the administrator, and,
therefore, could not take advantage of a
decree for him, as an estoppel against a
subsequent proceeding against her) a decree in favor of the administrator would
be primafa-te evidence, or at least would
be evidence, in her favor should she be
subsequently proceeded against. Gf. Hay's
Appeal, 152 Pa. 1384 ; Phillips v. R. R.
Co., 107 Pa. 465; Sergeant's Heirs v.
Ewing, 36 Pa. 156; Bunnell v. Smith, 8
W. N. C. 352; Kessler v. M'Conachy, 1
Rawle, 435; Holmes v. Frost, 125 Pa. 328;
Cox v. Hartranft, 154 Pa. 457.
It follows, we think, since Mrs. Stilwell
could use the decree in favor of the administrator to defend her right to the
watch, that she is to be treated as a party
having to the exceptants, an adverse interest, and that she can be called for crossexamination.
Decree reversed with procedendo.

BREWER vs. BELFORD.
_Promissory notes-Sunday law-Endorsers liability on a note delivered on Sunday when endorsed on Saturday.
STATEUMENT OF THE CASE.

Belford sold, on Sunday, a horse to
Adam Schofield, who, at the same time, delivered a promissory note at three months

for the price, viz.: $150, which note was
payable to Belford, and had been endorsed
by him on the previous day. Tihree days
before the note became due, Belford
waived protest. The note was not paid.
In this assumpsit, the defense is that the
note was made on Sunday. Schofield continued to keep the horse until two weeks
before this suit, when he sold it for $175.
DIVELY and SHO&ro for plaintiff.
The endorser of a negotiable note warrants its validity. Norton on Bills and
Notes, p. 162; Whitemore v. Montgomery,
165 Pa. 253; Chestnut v. Harbaugh, 78
Pa. 473; McSparren v. Neelev, 91 Pa. 17;
Zimmerman v. Rote, 75 Pa. 188; Muron
v. Reed, 79 Pa. 380.
FLYNN and HILLYER for defendant.
Contracts entered into on Sunday are
void, and the policy of the law is to leave
the parties where it found them. Kepner
v. Keefer, 6 Watts 231 ; Fruman v. Ahl,
55 Pa. 325; Whim v. Applegate, 26 Pa.
140; Sherman v. Roberts, 1 Grant 261.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action by Brewer againstBelford to recover on a note for purchase price
of a horse, viz: $150, purchased from Belford by Schofield.
The defense, to payment of the note,
which is in the hands of Brewer, a third
party, is that the note was executed and
delivered on Sunday, and while endorsed
by Belford the day previous to the sale,
being thus executed and delivered, is
rendered void by our act of assembly,
passed 22d of April, 1794.
This act among other things provides:
"If any person shall do or perform any
worldly employment or business whatsoever, on the Lord's day, commonly called
the Sabbath, works of necessity and
charity excepted, etc., and be convicted
thereof, he shall pay four dollars," etc.
At common law the making of a contract or giving of such note, as we here
have, was not prohibited and, therefore,
would not have been void on that account.
Contracts could be made on Sunday if
they did not come within the statute
which forbade "worldly labor, business or
work of a man's ordinary calling." But
our statute is more comprehensive and
had a recovery on this note been attempted
as between the original parties to the contract, we should have no hesitation in saying there could be no recovery.
But here a new phase presents itself.
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The note has passed into hands of a third
party, and endorsed by Belford the day
previous to the sale of the horse. We can
scarcely conceive of such an arrangement
in conveyance of a negotiablt paper but
we thus interpret statement of facts.
We also presume that the transfer of
note from Belford to Brewer took place
some time subsequent to sale of the horse,
and not on Sunday, and since the delivery,
and not the signing of a note fixes date of
its delivery, we believe that the endorsement of note by Belford did not take effect
until transfer of same to Brewer.
In doing this, an entirely new contract
was created and when Belford transferred
endorsed note to Brewer, he implicitly
guaranteed validity of it, or at least payment, and Brewer took same divested of
all equities existing as between original
parties.
There seems to be a well founded principle, supported by eminent authority,
starting far in the past and extending up
to present time, which holds "wherea bill
has passed to the plaintiff without any
proof of bad faith in him, there is no
Goodman v.
objection to the title."
Harvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870. Also, that "a
holder of b bill of exchange endorsed in
blank, or other negotiable paper transferable by delivery, can give a title which
he does not himself possess, to a person
taking them bonafide for value." Bush
v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388 ; Miller v. Race,
1 Burrow 453.
In McLaughlin v. Conn., 4 Rawle 464,
and Bullock v. Wilcox, 7 Watts 328, the
rule is laid down that "a bonafide holder
for value and without notice, of a negotiable note made to A B or bearer, is entitled
to recover on it against the maker, free
from any equities subsisting as bet ieen
the original parties."
The Pennsylvania courts are very emphatic in their refusal of relief to any
party who, by reason of fraud practiced
upon him, signed a negotiable note. Zimmerman v. Rote, 75 Pa. 188; Phelan v.
Mass., 67 Pa. 59.
How much more so should they be
where he who commits the fraud knowingly and willingly, seeks to set up his
own wrong to protect himself as against
an innocent purchaser? Unger v. Boas,
13 Pa. 600.

In order to defeat payment, Belford
must not only show not to have taken
note under given circumstances, but bur-*
den of proof is upon him to show that
plaintiff took it malafide.
Judgment for plaintiff.
FLEITZ, J.
OPINION OF T E SUPERIOR COURT.

The note of Schofield was made by him
and delivered to Belford, in exchange for
a horse, on Sunday. No right of action
sprang out of such a note. Kepner v.
Keefer, 6 W. 231.
We are not informed when this note
was endorsed to Brewer. The name of
Belford was written upon it, for some
reason even before its delivery to him, viz:
on Saturday. There is no reason for inferring that it was delivered to Brewer on
Sunday. If Belford wishes to take any
advantage from the assumed fact that it
was delivered on Sunday, he should have
proven it. Hadley v. Snevily, 1 W. & S.
477.
By endorsing the note Belford warranted
that it was valid and enforceable. Norton
on Bills and Notes, p.'162. Whether it was
so or not, that is, whether Schofield could
be compelled to pay it by Brewer, as a
bona fide purchaser for value, it is unnecessary for us now to decide. The
question is merely whether Belford, as
endorser, can be compelled to pay the
note. "In warranting its validity, he
agrees that if the paper cannot be enforced
against the acceptor or maker, because of
some illegality in its inception, for example
because it was given for a gaming debt, or
void for usury, or given for other illegal
considerations, these defences will not
avail him."
If Belford pays the note, he must look
to Schofield either as maker of the note,
(which he cannot do), or as holding a
horse which has not became his by any
valid contract, or, as having, as seller of
the horse, received $175, which in equity
belongs to Belford.
Judgment affirmed.
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BOYD vs. AMES.
3uortgage-Alienationof mortgagedpremises-Payments by mortgagor not binding on terre tenant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Ames made a mortgage of six adjoining
houses to Boyd for $6,000, and shortly after
sold one of them to John T-empe who took
possebsion. Boyd became aware of the
conveyance within a few days after it oc.urred. Ames continued to pay the interest, and, occasionally a small part of
the principal, through 24 years. Trempe
was never called on for any, and never
paid any. In the 25th year, after the maturity of the mortgage, Boyd sues out this
scire facias, calling on Trempe as terre
tenant.
McDoNALD and JONES for the plaintiff
cited.
Act of 1705 (1 19.M. L. 59); Trickett on
law of Liens in Pa., vol. 1, 160 ; Jones on
Mortgages, vol. 2, 28; Michener v.
Michener, 17 W. N. C. 266. Matber v.
Clark, I Watts 491 ; Corvan v. Getty, 5
Watts 531.
SOHWARTZKOPF for the defendant cited.
Frearv. Drinker, 8 Pa. 523; Michener v.
Michener, 17 W. N. C. 266; 2 Wharton
340; 4 Casey 505.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Although the record is not clear on this
point, we will assume that this mortgage
was recorded. This being so, the terre
tenant cannot plead ignorance of the existence of the mortgage when his interest
was attached. While the estate remaining in the hands of the mortgagor is primarily liable for the mortgage debt and
the mortgagee should proceed against the
property remaining in the hands of the
mortgagor, nevertheless, we are justified
in inferring from the fact that the terre
tenant was called in that the property in
the mortgagor's hands was insufficient to
pay the mortgage, consequently, we are to
determine whether the interest of the
terre tenant is liable in this instance.
There is no presumption of payment as
regards Ames.
The lapse of twenty years without evidence of partial payments or other recognition of the debt by the mortgagor within
that time, or assertion of its non-payment
by the mortgagee within that period, is
presumptive evidence of payment.

As Ames continued to pay the interest
and occasionally a part of the principal
through twenty-four years, he plainly
does not come within this rule. But will
these partial payments made by the mortgagor and which have prevented a presumption of payment arising in his favor,
be admissible to bind the terre tenant?
If the statutory period had elapsed without anything arising to rebut the presumption of payment, then the question
as to whether or not an admission by the
mortgagor after the presumption had
arisen, would have the effect of binding
the interest of the terre tenant, is a question we are not called upon to decide.
In this case the payments had been
made before the presumption arose, and if
the terre tenant defended this action on
this ground it would in effect be setting
up as a defense something that never
existed.
In Turner v. Flenniken, 164 Pa. 471,
five years after the land was mortgaged,
the terre tenant's interest attached. Suit
was brought twenty-eight years after the
date of the mortgage. .Payments had been
made by the mortgagor three years before
suit was brought, and twenty-five years
after date of mortgage. The terrd tenant
requested the court to charge that, as
against him the part payments were insufficient to rebut the presumption of payment. Couru refused to so charge, and on
appeal it was held to be no error.
In Levers v. Van Buskirk, 7 W. & S.
70, the terre tenant's interest attached
fifteen days after the mortgage was given.
Eleven years later an amicable action in
ejectment was brought on an agreement
between the parties to the mortgage. The
terre tenant was not a party to the action
at all. Judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff and entered. Thirteen years after
the judgment was given and twenty-four
years after the mortgage was given, sci.
fa. sur judgment was issued against the
heirs of the mortgagor and the terre
tenants. The plaintiffs offered in evidence,
to rebut the presumption of payment
arising from the lapse of more than twenty
years, the record of the proceedings in the
amicable ejectment suit. The evidence
showed ejectment instituted by plaintiffs'
ancestors to recover a portiop of the land
mortgaged and the judgment thereon.
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Court held that it was no objection that
the original ejectment and proceedings
were against the mortgagor alone; that the
terre tenant bought after the mortgage
was given and recorded and, therefore,
took the lands subject to it. We think
this principle governs the case at bar
and consequently judgment is rendered
for the plaintiff.
BENJA'MIN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

This case presents a question which, so
far as we have discovered, has not been
distinctly considered by any court of this
state. The facts of Turner v. Flenniken,
164 Pa. 469, might have suggested it, but
do not seem to have done so. The two or
three lines of the opinion, Williams, J.,
which deal wi.th them, indicate that the
question had not arrested his attention.
In Levers v. Van Buskirk, 7 W. & S. 70,
the mortgagor conveyed to Van Buskirk a
portion of the premises, April 20, 1810. In
1821, an amicable ejectment by the mortgagee, Levers, against Horn, the mortgagor,
for another part of the premises, was
brought, to enforce payment of the balance
of the debt. The suit was referred to referees, who found $1426.90 still due. Jqdgmert was entered on the award. Ascirefacias to revive this judgment was issued in
1829, and an alias in 1834i to which the return was made known to the widow and
heirs of Van Buskirk. They pleaded, denying that Horn had interest in the land,
when lie made the mortgage (untrue), and
that they were terre tenants of any land,
which had been of Horn, against whom
the judgment had been rendered (untrue).
They also pleaded payment, and nil tenent.
At the trial they filed a disclaimer as to
the lands for which the ejectment had
been brought. The jury, April 29, 1835,
found due $2489.16, on default of payment
of which, plaintiff should have liberty to
take out a habere facias possessionem for
the lands described. Another ejectment,
for the land sold by Horn to Van Buskirk,
was brought August 18, 1841. The court
found in the proceedings recited, a sufficient demand within 20 years before Aug.
18, 1841, to repel the presumption of payment. The case is no authority, therefore,
for the doetrine that though no demand
had been made on Van Buskirk, nor any
payment made by him for 20 years, pay-

ments or acknowledgments made by the
mortgagor in that time would rebut the
presumption. C!!. Limitations, p. 495, 496.
The question has been learnedly discussed in Ely v. Wilson, 61 N. J. Eq. 94,
and the result reached is that, if a part of
the mortgaged premises Is, with the knowledge of the mortgagee conveyed to another, and the period of presumption runs
by without payment or acknowledgment
by the grantee, and without demand upon
him, his land is discharged because of the
adverseness of the possession of the land
by the terre tenant.
Not deciding whether, after conveyance
of the land the mortgagor can waive or
destroy the presumption of payment as
respects his grantee, by making-payments
irpon his bond, we think that the controversy between Boyd and Ames is to be
solved by other principles. The act of
April 29th, 1855, P. L. 369, P. & L" Dig.
2227, enacts that "In all cases where no
payment, claim or demand shall have been
made on account of, or for any ground
rent, annuity or other charge upon real
estate for 21 years, or nq declaration or
acknowledgment of the existence thereof
shall have been made within that period
by the owner of the premises subject to
such ground rent, annuity or charge, a release or extinguishment thereof shall be
presumed, and such ground rent, annuity
or charge shall thereafter be irrecoverable," etc.
The act speaks of "ground rent, annuity
Are- mortgages emor other charge."
braced within "other charge"? Sharswood, J., in 1871, remarked, "my opinion
is that the act should have a liberal construction, and be held to apply to all kinds
of charges upon real estate, to which the
ordinary presumption of payment applied,
making such presumption to bejuris et de
jure," but the members of the court were
"divided in opinion." Pratt v. Eby, 67
Pa. 396. It may be inferred, from a dictum
in Biddle v. Hoover, 120 Pa. 221, that
Paxson, J., entertained, in 1888, the
opinion of Justice Sharswood. There is
no reason for conclusively presuming
ground rests or legacies paid in 21 years
from the last payment, recognition or demand, that would not justify the same
presumption as to mortgages.
If the presumption is applicable to
mortgages, it is necessary to ascertain
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whether the partial payment, or payment
of interest, which is to prevent the rise of
the presumption must be made by the
owner of the premises.
The "declaration or acknowledgment of
the existence" of the charge, must, by the
express language of the statute, be made
"by the owner of the premises subject to"
such charge. An acknowledgment by the
covenantor, in a ground rent deed, will
avail nothing, as against the terre tenant,
who has been owner for 21 years, without
making acknowledgment. Barber v. Mullen, 176 Pa. 331.
The significance of a payment is that it
implies an acknowledgment of the existence of the debt. So it is viewed, in cases
involving the tolling of the bar of the
statute of limitations. Coleman v. Fobes,
22 Pa. 156; Limitations, p. 351. There
ought not to be a difference between the
effect of acknowledging by paying, and
that of acknowledging in some othermode.
If the mortgagor's verbal admission will
not affect his grantee, the terre tenant,
neither should his admission implied in
the act of making a payment of interest or
of part of the principal. Hence, in Gassman's Estate, 3 Walk 126, Ashman, J.,
held, that a payment by the covenantor
on a ground rent deed within 21 years,
would not keep alive the ground rent, as
respects a portion of the premises transferred more than 21 years ago, to a terre
tenant. Another ground for the decision
was that the covenantor having conveyed
for a full price- a part of the premises,
which Gassman ultimately acquired, the
retained portion, was in equity bound to
indemnify him, and that the owner of the
rent subsequently became the owner of
this retained portion. The conveyance of
a part of the mortgaged premises, to Gassman, was mad6 in 1833. The owner of
the other portion paid the rent to about
1850 without suit. Then the rent for 18611863 was paid, and suit brought for the
intervening rent, and judgment recovered
against the owner of the other portion.
The claim against Gassman's estate was
for the rent accruing from 1863 to 1869,
and from 1869 to 1878. Thd estate was
undergoing distribution in 1881.
For 24 years Ames, the mortgagor, continued to make payments at intervals, but
Trempe was "never called on for any, and
never paid any.'
To the scirefaciasnow

sued out, we think that Trempe has a
good defence under the act of April 27,1855
Judgment reversed.
IEIRS OF THOMAS LAZARUS vs.
M. W. MORRIS.
Eminent domain-Taking property for
school purposes under Act of April 9,
1867-Estate acquired by school district.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In the year 1868, the Hanover school
district, of Luzerne county, Penn'a, being
unable to procure an eligible site for a
school house, took advantage of the Act of
April 9th, 1867, sec. 1, P. L. 51, and gave
damage to the owner of the land condemned under the above mentioned act
in the amount of $375.00. Proceedings
were perfectly regular under the act.
Land was in the name of the heirs of
George Deal.
Equitable title was in
Thomas Lazarus. Lazarus satisfies the
judgment for $375.00. In 1874 he, Lazarus,
becomes the owner in fee by deed of a
certain tract of which the land appropriated by the aforesaid district is a part.
Deed was of the common form, granting
all the right, title and interest, together
with the remainder orremainders, reversion or reversions, etc.
The school district aforesaid held the
land from the time of the taking until
1896, June the 6th. At that time they
abandoned the site, where the school
house had been erected, and M. W. Morris
received a deed for the same, consideration being $1,000.00, cash.
Ejectment by the heirs of Thomas Lazarus v. M. W. Morris.
GERBER

and

WATSON

for the plaintiff.

Lazarus had a title which passed to his
heirs and will support ejectment. McCullough v. Stover, 119 Pa. 432; Hawn v.
Norris, 4 Biun. 77; Deitzler v. Mishler,
37 Pa. 82.
The exercise of eminent domain by the
State or its grantee is in derogation of
private right, and the authority in the
grantee is to be strictly construed. Lance's
Appeal, 55 Pa. 26; Cemetery v. R. R. Co.,
68 N. Y. 591.
Only an easement will pass unless a fee
is necessary. Lyon v. Gormley, 63 Pa.
263 ; Phil'a, W. & B. v. Williams, 54 Pa.
108; Jessup v. Loucks, 55 Pa. 350; Western Pa. v. Johnson, 59 Pa. 294; P. & L.
E. R. R. v. Brice, 102 Pa. 23.
When an easement or a base or conditional fee alone has been given, and con-
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dition broken, the right of possession is
in the original owner. Turnpike Co. v.
Stoever, 6 W. & S. 379; Lance's Appe.d
supra; Craig v. Allegheny, 53 Pa. 477;
Haldeman v. R. R. Co., 50 Pa. 425.
BIsHoP and HAXBLIN for the defendant.

In determining the quality of the estate
taken, the intention of the legislature controls. Scott v. Pittsburg, 1 Pa. 309.
To arrive at the intention of the legislature it is necessary to consider (1) the
object to be accomplished, and (2) state of
the law when act of 1867 was passed.
Act of May 8, 1854, P. & L. 1, p. 755. As
to power of disposal of property held by
school district. McCollough v. School
District, 11 Pa. 447.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The only point in dispute in this case is
as to the nature of the estate taken by the
school district under the condemnation
proceedings, as provided by the Act of
Assembly of April 9, 1867. "The right of
the Commonwealth to take private property, or authorize it to be taken on comnpensatiola made, exists in her sovereign
right of eminent domain, and can never
be lawfully exercised but for a public purpose. The public interest must be at the
basis of the.exercise or it would be confiscation to exercise it. This being the reason
for the exercise of such power, it requires
no argument to prove that after the right
has been exercised the use of the property
must be held in accordance with and for
the purpose which justified such taking.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directed by the State or its
authorized agent, is necessary in derogation of private right, and the rule in that
case is that the authority is to be strictly
construed." Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. 16.
This case along with others is cited for
authority that, under the act of 1867, there
is a presumption against the school district taking a fee. Yet, we think, a careful study of the case will show that the
point decided was, that, after the right
has been exercised, the property must be
held and used in accordance with and for
the purpose which justified its taking.
There is no presumption against a fee
passing; for even in cases where a fee
passes under the right of eminent domain,
the property must be held and used for
the purposes which justified its taking.
It is settled, that when a fee simple is acquired under the right of eminent domain,
and the purpose for which such right was

22.1

exercised no longer exists, a cessation of
that use would not revest the title thereto
in the former owner. Haldeman v. P. R.
R., 50 Pa. 425; North Branch Canal Co.
v. Hirun, 44 Pa. 418. When the quantity
or interest to be taken is not definitely set
forth by the legislature, only such an
estate or interest is taken as is necessary
to answer the purposes in view, and the
courts enforce a strict construction of this
principle. But in all the cases where this
construction has been applied, the grantees have been private corporations. In
Pitts., etc., R'y Co. v. Bruce, 102 Pa. 23,
authority was given the Canal Co. to take
and use such land and material as may be
necessary to construct and maintain the
works. It was held that when the canal
was abandoned the use and occupation of
the land reverted to the original owner of
the fee.
In the case of the Union Canal Co. v.
Young, 1 Wharton 410, affirmed in Wyoming Coal Co. v. Price, 81 Pa. 156, it was
held, that when land is taken by eminent
domain by the state, for the purpose of
building a canal, (where there was a dispute as to the estate taken by the state)
the presumption is that a fee is acquired
and not a mere easement. The act in
question provides: "It shall be lawful
* * * to enter upon and occupy sufficient ground for the purpose * * * *
*

and to use and occupy the same for the
purpose of erecting thereon a school house,
and for all damages done and suffered, or
which shall accrue to the owners of such
land, by resson of the taking of the same
for the purposes aforesaid, payment shall
be made; the viewers having viewed the
premises, they shall determine the quantity and value of the land so taken," etc.
Prior to the passage of this act, the acts
of 1836 and 1854 empowered the school
districts to purchase and hold real estate
necessary for school lurposes, and to sell,
alien, and dispose of the same. It is insisted, that under the act of 1867, only an
easement is taken; that the land can only
be held so long as it is used for school purposes, and on a discontinuance of this use,
the land so taken, reverts back to the
original owner.
The act of 1867, gives the district power
to occupy the ground for the purpose of
erecting a school house, and compels it to
pay damages for the taking for such pur-
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poses, but it also provides that viewers
shall determine the value of the land
taken, for the purposes aforesaid.
We
think that under this statute the school
district is limited to taking land for school
purposes only, but that it does not confirm
their ownership to the land so taken, for
the period while the land is used for such
purposes.
It would hardly be reasonable to suppose
that the legislature intended that the
school district should take a less estate
under the act of 1867, than was permitted
to be taken under the previous acts.
Judgment for defendant.
PEIGUTEL, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Lazarus, the equitable owner under a
contract of sale, of a tract of land, a part of
which was, in 1869, taken by the school
district for a school site, obtained as damages $375, assessed according to the provisions of the act of April 9th, 1867, 1 P. &
L. 774. In 1874 he received a deed for the
tract. After using the lot for school purposes from the time of taking it, the
school district in 1896, ceased to use it for a
school and conveyed it in fee to M. W,
Morris for $1,000.
This ejectment is to
test Morris' title.
If the school district obtained a fee, the
conveyance to Morris passed that fee to
him, and Lazarus cannot recover. The
only rival conceptions of the right acquired
by the district would be that of a base fee
determinable upon the cesser of the use by
it of the laud as a school site, or that of an
easement similarly determinable.
The distinction between base fee and
base easement is unimportant, even if
substantial. Though it has been said that
the right acquired by a railroad company
to its way, is more than the latter, is the
former; Pa. Schuylkill V. R. R. v. Reading Paper Mills, 149 Pa. 18 (a dictum cited
approvingly in later cases). Reading v.
Davis, 153 Pa. 360; Pittsburg, etc., R. R.
Co. v. Peet, 152 Pa. 488; Philadelphia v.
Ward, 174 Pa. 45, [a bridge case] ), it is
conceded to be terminable by the cessation
of the use of the strip for railroad purposes.
The important question is, not whether
the district got a fee-so far as a fee is different from an easement-but whether
what it got, ended with the termination
of the use of the lot for a school house.

It seems, generally, that when rights
over land are acquired under the'eminent
domain, they are terminable. This is true
of the public's right of way, over highways, or streets; of a railroad's right of
way. But, from the language of the act
of assembly, governing its acquisition, the
right of the Commonwealth to the land
taken for the Pennsylvania canal, has
been repeatedly held to he an absolute fee.
Cameron v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R., 157 Pa.
617; Penna. Canal Co. v. Billings, 94 Pa.
40; Smucker v. Penna. R. R., Pa. 40;
Penna. Canal Co. v. Harris, 101 Pa. 80;
Commonwealth v. McAllister, 2 W. 190;
Wyoming Transportation Co..v. Price, 81
Pa. 156. Pittsburg acquired a fee in the
Du Quesne Way, 1 Par. 309.
The right of the city of Reading to the
site of a pumping station was assimilated
by the court to that of a railroad to its
way, in Reading v. Davis, 153 Pa. 360,
although the city had erected its pumping
plant, a dwelling house and a stable upon
it, but this comparison was by way of
dictum only. On the other hand, Philadelphia hav'ing taken an entire tract for a
reservoir site, the trial court's .instruction
to the jury that the measure of damages
was the value of the land at the time of
taking, was approved, no suggestion being
made that the terminable quality of the
city's tenure should be considered in mitigation of damages. Warden v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 523.
Answering the precise question awaiting decision, there are a dictum of Judge
Elwell, acting as referee, that the legal
title remains in the person who was expropriated, "to whom the property will
revert should it cease to be used for the
purposes of a public school house for Troy
school district ;" Long v. Fuller, 68 Pa.
170; and a dictum of a very excellent
judge, Rowe, of Franklin County, "I
think a school district taking land under
the act of 1867, for the site of a school
house, acquires the fee and not a perpetual
easement." Waynesboro' school district,
1 Pa. C. C. 422. The considerations suggested by Judge Rowe are persuasive. The
school district acquires usually a bare lot.
It erects a building upon it which may
cost thousands or tens of thousands of
dollars. If its interest is terminable, it
can never change the site of the school
without sacrificing what it paid for the
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land, and much of what it expended in
the erection of the building. When a narrow strip of land is taken, for a street or
road, costly improvements are not put on
it. Besides it would be excessively inconvenient to treat the strip as suseeptible of
abandonment for road purposes, and of becoming the property in fee of some other
than the adjacent land owner.
The theory that the district gets a determinable estate, would in cases of long
tenure for school purposes, before abandonment, entail difficulties in the ascertainment of the reversioner. A plot might lie
used for 100 or 150 years before its school
use should cease. If it is then reverted to
the heirs of the grantor, these would
probably be undiscoverable. The adjacent
land may have passed by onveyance, devise, execution-sale, etc., to others than
him who owned when the school site was
taken. A sale of land, on which is a street
or roadway, would carry the soil under the
street or road, but we know no established
principle that would carry an acre school
lot, by implication, on the conveyance of
the tract of which it formerly formed a
part.
The learned court below, and Judge
Rowe, in the case cited supra, have adverted to the diction of the act of 1867, the
viewers "shall determine the quantity and
value of said land so taken," but this
value is not declared to be the measure of
damages. If the price taken, is part of a
larger, the viewers would have to set off
the advantages, if any, to the remainder,
against the disadvantages of being deprived of the school site. We do not
understand that the legislature is laying
down any measure of damages different
from the one recognized in railroad or
highway cases.
Upon the whole, we are satisfied with
the conclusion reached by the learned
court below.
Jujdgment affirmed.
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STEVENSON vs. MILLER.
Executory contract for sale of land-Incumbrances arising after contract but
before delivery of deed releases vendeeEquity jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

An executory contract was entered into
by the above named parties for the sale of
land. Stevenson, the seller, giving a bond
to convey a title free from all incumbrances. Before the time for conveyance,
a fourth part of the land was taken by the
right of eminent domain exercised by a
railroad company. The defendant, purchaser, now claims the right to rescind
the contract on grounds of failure of
consideration ; but the plaintiff tenders a
deed and prays that the contract be specifically enforced.
WILSON

and

LLOYD

for the plaintiff.

Eminent domain overrides all rights of
private property, and subordinates all
piivate contracts to its operation. Brown
v. Corey, 43 Pa. 495; Paliret's Appeal, 67
Pa. 479. 91 Pa. 216.
Specific performance for sale of land will
be decreed at suit of vendor. Findley v.
Aiken, 1 Grant 83; Kauffman's Appeal,
55 Pa. 383.
HOUCK for the defendant.
The bill is simply for the purchase
money. There is an adequate remedy at
law. Finley v.Aiken, 1 Grant 83; Werli's
Appeal, 57 Pa. 467; Smalt's Appeal, 99 Pa.
311 ;Dorffv. Schmunk, 197 Pa. 298 ; Derry
v. Heck, 6 Forman 41.
Equity will not interfere when objection is made to form of action by demurrer. Adams v. Beach, I Phila. 99; 1 F.
& H. Practice 75; Adams' Appeal, 113
Pa. 449; Drake v. Lacoe, 157 Pa. 17.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This bill in equity for the specific performance of a contract, arises upon a contract for the sale of land, the terms of the
contract being as follows: Stevenson, the
seller, gave a bond to convey a title free
from encumbrances. Before the time for
conveyance, a fourth part of the land was
taken by the right of eminent domain
exercised by a railroad company. The
defendant purchaser now claims the right
to rescind the contract on grounds of
failure of consideration ; but the plaintiff
tenders a deed and prays that the contract
be specifically enforced.
The question, therefore, which confronts us in this case, is, does the right of
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eminent domain as exercised by the railroad company, give the defendant the
right to rescind his contract on grounds
of failure of consideration ?
Bouvier defines the right of eminent
domain as "The superior right of property
subsisting in a sovereignty, by which private property may in certain cases be taken
or its use controlled for the public benefit,
without regard to the wishes of the
owner." A railroad is declared to be a
public use in the following cases: 135 U.
S. 641 ; 9 N. Y. 588 ; 43 N. Y. 137, and 47
N. J. L. 43.
Brown v. Corey & Peterson, 43 Pa. 495,
holds "an entry on another's land to build
or use a lateral railroad, is an entry under
the state, exercising the right of eminent
domain and in pursuance of public law;
and all private contracts are subordinate
thereto."
It is also held in this case that "no
covenants or private contracts between
citizens can possibly be violated by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain,
because none can stand in the way of
State authority. It is a resumption by
the sovereign of a clear right of sovereignty, in subordination to which the
covenants of the deed were made. Had
the parties expressly contracted against
the exercise of this right, they could not
have found the sovereign, much less can
their covenants, made for other purposes,
be permitted to have the effect claimed
for them."
The principle of this case is analogous
to the case before us and upon this principle, as laid down so clearly, we are of the
opinion that the right of eminent domain
overrides all rights of private property
and subordinates all private contracts
to its operation. Therefore, the bond
given by Stevenson, to convey a title free
from all encumbrances, has not been violated, and the defendant has no grounds
upon which he may legally refuse to perform the contract. But has the plaintiff
brought his action in tile proper court?
The defendant challenges the jurisdiction
of equity by demurrer. The prayer of the
plaintiff that the contract be specifically
enforced amounts to a suit for simply the
purchase money.
In Finley v. Aiken, 1 Grant 83, Justice
Black says the act of 1836 confers upon

the courts of equity the power of "affording specific xelief, when a recovery in
damages would be an inadequate remedy."
This is all that relates to the subject now
in hand. Thus if a party cannot be compensated in damages, he may go into
chancery, not for remedy, but for relief.
This implies that he must be suffering
something, from which he desires and
ought to be relieved. What can that be
in the case of a party who seeks the benefit
of a contract? Certainly not the contract
itself, for he does not ask to be relieved
from that; the evil which he demands
that equity shall cover, is the inability of
the law to do him justice, it is not enough,
therefore, to show that damages would be
inadequate. If there be a complete remedy
at law for him in any shape, then equity
can give him nothing, which with the
smallest propriety could be called relief.
Justice Black says: "This indeed is the
very ground on which all equity jurisdiction is based. It admits its functions to
be extraordinary and professes to interfere
only when justice can be done in no other
way. To assume jurisdiction in equity of
a cause which can be as well determined
in an action at law, is not to do equity,
but to administer lw in a form not legal,
it would not be granting relief, but
simply usurping power. The rule to
which I have here referred as the true
one, is so universally acknowledged that
it was stamped indelibly on the very form
of the proceeding. Every bill for specific
performance prays for relief, on the express ground that the plaintiff has no
remedy at law."
In Finley v. Aiken, the bill was dismissed on its merits, so that the case is
an authority only for this: that a bill for
specific performance will be entertained
ofi behalf of a vendor only when his contract stands in need of the specific relief
which a courtofequity only can give. But,
where, as in this case, no decree is sought
but one for the payment of money, which
can be readily recovered in an action at
law. The case is not one of specific relief
and consequently does not.fall within the
equity head of granting relief where a
recovery in damages would be an inadeKauffman's Appeal, 55
quate remedy.
Pa. 383.
The opinion of Justice Black, in Finley
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v. Aiken, is followed by the following
cases: Deck's Appeal, 57 Pa. 467; Smaltz's
Appeal, 99 Pa. 311; Dorff v. Schmink,
197 Pa. 298; Derry v. Heck, 6 Forum 41.
The opinion of this court is, that this is
not the proper action for the plaintiff to
enforce his claims and the demurrer is,
therefore, sustained.
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templated that the grantor or lessor was
making himself liable for the consequences
of acts which were to occur in the future,
and without authority derived from him
or his predecessors in ownership.
The case before us is not that of a covenant in a deed, making the covenantor responsible after the conveyance. It is a
PRICKETT, J.
bond to do a future act, that is, to convey
land at a future time, and further, then to
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
But two objections to the granting of convey it "free from all encumbrances."
the decree prayed for by the plaintiff, are The vendor might have put encumbrances
on it before, and he might put them upon
made, viz: (a) the incidence of the eminent
domain of the state, between the making it after making the contract. His bond
of the contract and the time for the de- would surely be violated by encumbrances
of the latter class as much as by those of
livery and acceptance of the deed, and (b)
the want of jurisdiction of the court, on a the former. The bond does not distinguish
between encumbrances created by the
bill in equity.
Stevenson's bond stipulated for a con- obligor and those created by another ; and
veyance of the land "free from all encum- the vendee would find, when ie was called
brances." A right of way of a railroad on to accept a conveyance, a railroad's
right of way then on the premises, equally
company, like that of any non-municipal
irksome and objectionable whether it had
corporation or individual, is an encumoriginated from a release or grant from the
brance, within the meaning of the term,
vendor, or had been taken in invitum.
as used by the parties. 2 Tiffany, Real
Prop. 905; Dyer v. Wightman, 66 Pa. 425. The question is one of interpretation of
the contract. Our conclusion is that StevIt differs, in this respect, from a public
road, Patterson v. Artfhurs, 9W. 152; Wil- enson in using the language of the bond,
son v. Cochran, 46 Pa. 233, which prima undertook that when at a future day he
facie is not treated as an encumbrance of should convey, the land should be free
the class intended. Peck v. Jones, 70 Pa. from encumbrances; that the right of way
83. [But see People's Saving Bank v. is an encumbrance, and that he, therefore,
is not proposing to perform his contract,
Alexander, 3 Cent. 388, where the fact
that a street had been laid out prior to when he tenders a deed for the land in its
present condition. Other courts may on a
making the contract, though not yet
similar state of facts have reached another
opened, prevented specific performance at
conclusion.
the suit of the vendor.]
It is unnecessary to consider whether,
A covenant of warranty or against encumbrances, is not applicable to rights of had the right of way not been an encumway or other easements which come into brance of the class from which the conexistence by the exertion of the state's tract was that the land should be free,
Stevenson could have enforced specific
eminent domain, after the conveyance.
Though the eminent domain of the state performance by a bill in equity.
Appeal dismissed.
exists always, and all contracts for the
sale or lease of land, are made subject to
JEFFRIES vs. SHILLON.
it, the covenant is not understood to be a
guarantee against its existence or a future
jectment- Wills, construction of- Enappropriation in the exercise of it by the
forcement of a contract to convey an
state, or the state's delegate. Frost v.
executory devise.
Earnest, 4 Wh. 86; Ake v. Mason, 101 Pa.
17; Schuylkill & Dauphin R. R. Co. v.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Schmoele, 57 Pa. 271; Dyer v. Wightman,
John Shillon, in 1891, devised to Fred.
66 Pa. 425 ; Dobbins v. Brown, 12 Pa. 75 ; Thompson, a farm with a proviso
that if
Barnes v. Wilson, 116 Pa. 303 ; Peters v. no children survived him, the farm
should
Grubb, 21 Pa. 455. This is because it is go to Harrison Shillon if Harrison
should
difficult to suppose that the parties con- then at Fred.'s death, be alive.
Thompson
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lieu of this the court deems it only proper
to take into consideration the construction
of the facts of this case-slould any clildren have survived Fred. Thompson
then, of course, there would not be any
vesting of the title of the farm in Harrison
Shillon and the interest he had had would
at such an event be abolished. The fact
now arises, did any children of Thompson
live longer than he did himself?
By the Code of Napoleon the rule appears that in case several meet death by
CAREY and JoNEs for plaintiff.
If a grant of an executory devise be the same disaster the presumption as to
made by one who becomes the devisee
survivorship is to be ascertained by the
subsequently to the happening of the concircumstances of the event and in absence
tingency, his grant would by oestoppel,
of all such evidence then by age and sex
convey to the grantee, the interest which
of the -person. There is much dispute on
he subsequently acquires. Tiedman on
this law. The rule is not uniform in this
Real Property, 532; Goodlittle v. Woods,
Willes 211; Jones v. Rowe, 3 Tenn. 88;
or foreign countries. In the case of Coye
86 L. R. A. 75 ; 32 L. R. A. 595.
v. Leach, 8 Metcalf (Mass.) 371, a simiRENo and HENNEKE for defendant.
lar chain of facts, so far as cause of death
Plaintiff cannot recover because of his
is concerned, appears to the case at bar,
own laches in not making a tender of perand it was held that a father and his
formance. Graver v. Scott, 80 Pa. 88 ;
daughter died together; that there was
Nicol v. Carr, 35 Pa. 384; Bell v. Clark,
11 Pa. 92; Riter v. Maul, 46 Pa, 376: Rus- no legal presumption that either survived
sel v. Baughman, 94 Pa. 104.
the other. In summing up the authorities
OPINION OF THE COURT.
this seems to be the general rule.
Going further and considering the facts
There is no dispute whateyer that the
estate involved in this case is an Ex- more deeply the court can but decide that
all of Thompson's family died together as
ecutory Devise, It clearly fits itself to the
definition of such as given by Mr. Tied- it is plainly set forth that Thompson and
man in his book on Real Property, page his family were drowned, that-"Harrison
Shillon now being entitled to the farm
508: "An executory devise is a future in* * * * * *,'" from this but one and
terest or estate in lands limited in a will
in such a manner that it cannot take effect
only one reasonable conclusion can be
drawn, and no dispute can arise that Haras a remainder or as a future use,"-the
rison Shillon is entitled to the farm.
same definition in substance is set forth in
The defence claims that the contract of
the case of Lovett v. Lovett, 10 Phila. 537.
sale was an agreement to convey the inThe fact has arisen as to whether such
terest which Harrison Shillon then had,
an interest is alienable or not. In conand not the interest which he might
sideration of this point, the law as laid
down, by the eminent writer above men- acquire, should the title of the farm become vested in him. This is a clear cut
tioned, holds that they are alienable and
rule and no other logical reason can be
devisable whether the devises are vested
drawn. It would be folly to say that
in title or contingent and descendible to
Harrison Shillon would (in sound mental
the devisee's heirs, if he should die before
capacity) contract to sell a $20,000 farm
the devise vests in possession. However,
for $8,000, unless he was pushed for some
Mr. Washburn in his book on Real Propmoney. In this case no facts show that
erty, page 681, vol. 2., says :-"That they
he was in need of money. The court does
are only alienable when the devisee is an
not deem it expedient to presume such.
ascertained person"-and this seems to be
If it were to presume every little difficulty
the general doctrine which is taken by
that might arise (and does not exist in
our courts in many cases of this nature.
the facts) It would never reach a decision.
The question as to whether Harrison
The facts must be judged as they are and
Shillon had any interest to contract for
not as they might be.
the sale has been disputed and alleged by
In the case of Hale v. Hollen, 86 L. R.
the respective parties to the case, and in
had six children whose ages at theirdeath
ranged from eight to twenty-four years.
Four years after Shillon's death, Harrison
contracted to sell. his interest in the farm
to Jeffries. The farm was worth $20,000.
Four years after this, Thompson, his wife,
and all his children were drowned in a
shipwreck while on a voyage to Bombay.
Harrison, now .entitled to the farm, had
he not contracted to sell it to Jeffries,
takes possession. This is an ejectment.
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A. 75, the court held that a contract with
reference to the mere expectancy of an
inheritance may be equivalent to an assignment of the property. Alsoin Power's
Appeal, 63 Pa. 443, it was held: "An heir,
or expectant devisee, may sell or assign
his expectant or consigned interest, and
if the contract be a valuable consideration,
equity will enforce it."1 The same doctrine
appears in the case of Bayler v. the Commonwealth, 40 Pa. 37. From this law,
but one conclusion can be drawn and that
is-Jeffries was possessed of a good title
and had the right to possession-provided
first, that the consideration was valuable;
second, thht he made a tender of the
money prior to the commencement of the
suit; third, that the contract was a valid
one.
Whether the consideration was a valuable one or not-the court certainly thinks
it was when the great chance that was
taken, is brought to mind; for the chance
was just as even that Jeffries would
get it as that he would not.
Concerning the fact in reference to payment of the $8,000 being tendered prior to
the commencement of this suit, the facts
dIo not say that such was not done and the
court has no right to so presume. Therefore, according to the law it should be considered that he did tender it; as a man is
looked upon as doing that which he is
legally bound to do. It can not be disputed that this is a valid contract at all.
It possesses all the qualities of such and
none of illegality. It is not a wagering
contract, nor any species of such, so the
court can but judge it valid in every detail as all of the other properties exist.
It is quite true, as has been held in
Lane v. Raymond, 2 S. & R. 65, that the
burden is upon the one who claims the
land against the one in possession, and
that the plaintiff must recover on the
strength of his own title and can not rely
on the weakness. of that of the defendant;
also that the plaintiff must then show
that he had title at the commencement of
the suit and that he was entitled to possession. Schrack v. Zubler, 34 Pa. 38.
The acts of April 22d, 1856, do not work
a bar to the action in this case as argued
by the defence. These acts provide that
actions brought upon a contract forsale of
Iand, as in this case, must be brought
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within five (5) years from the making of
the contract. In the case at bar, the
action was commenced within that timeit being instituted four (4) years after the
making of the contract.
Therefore, in consideration of the facts
and law as above cited, the court finds
that the title at the commencement of this
suit was in Jeffries ; that he claims entirely upon it and not upon the weakness
of that of defendant, and in lieu of such.
Judgment is rendered accordingly.
KEELOR, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT

.

,

The devise of John Shillon was to Fred.
Thompson, in fee, subject to a conditional
limitation over to Harrison Shillon. "If
no children survived" Thompson, the farm
was to go to Harrison, should he be then
alive. This limitation is upon the double
contingency, (a) that no children of
Thompson's lived after him, and (b) that
Harrison survived him. The second of
these contingencies has been fulfilled.
Harrison Shillon has survived Thompson.
Has the first been fulfilled?
Thompson, while, with his family,
making a voyage to Bombay, eight years
after John Shillon's death, perished with
them in shipwreck. Ile who alleges that
any of the children survived Thompson,
must prove It. But there is no evidence
to support that averment. The ease must
be disposed of as if it appeared that parent
and children died simultaneously. Coye
v. Leach, 8 Met. 371; Fuller v. Linzee, 135
Mass. 468. A good discussion of cases by
Van Vorst, J., may be found in Newell v.
Nicholls, 12 Hun. 604. The question was
thoroughly canvassed in Underwood v.
Wing, 19 Beavan. 459; affirmed in 4 De.
Gen. M., and G., 633; Wing v. Angrave,
8 H. L. C. 183. The presumption that
both parent and child perished together,
is pronounced "safest and most convenient" by Greenleaf, Evid. (16 Boston
Edit.), p. 125. Prof. Wignore, in a note,
remarks: "If death by the same calamity
is all that is proved, the person who asserts
the survivorship must fail." Best states
that "when, therefore, a party on whom
the onus lies of proving the survivorship
of one individual over another, has no
evidence beyond the assumption that,
from age or sex, that individual must be
taken to h'ave struggled longer against
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death than his companion, he cannot succeed." Evid. (Chamberlayne's Ed.) 395.
We do not know the sex of the oldest children, nor the age of Thompson. There
are no circumstances which would justify
the inference that the former, or the
younger children, survived him. Harrison
Shillon alleging the survivorship of the
children, in order to defeat the plaintiff,
the burden is on him to establish that survivorship. He has failed to do this.
We must assume then, that no children
survived Fred Thompson. The event has
occurred, on which his fee was to come to
an end, and a fee in Harrison Shillon was
to arise. The right to this fee has passed
to Jeffries, if the contract between Harrison and him was valid.
That contract is not invalid because,
when it was made the interest of Harrison
Shillon was still contingent. Contingent
remainders and contingent executory devises are assignable, if the contingency
does not attach to the person who is to
take.
The ejectment is a substitute for a bill
in equity for a specific performance.
Would a chancellor enforce the contract?
There are no fraud, duress, undue influence revealed. It is not clear that for
the inadequacy of the price to be paid for
the land, the chancellor would decline to
compel the vendor to make the conveyance, unless it was so great as to suggest
fraud or imposition of some sort. Fry,
Specific Performance, 205; Bispham,
Equity, 436. When the contract was
made by these parties, the vendor had
only a contingent estate. It seemed very
improbable that it would ever vest.
Thompson had six children. They had
all passed the perils of early childhood.
That they would all perish before or with
him, was extremely unlikely. Iris by no
means clear, therefore, that, though the
value of an unconditional fee was $20,000,
the value of the contingent fee was greater
than $800. If such a feeis to be sold at all,
it must be sold at a price greatly below
that of the absolute fee, and to adopt the
principle that specific execution of contracts, when the price contracted for is
greatly below that of an absolute fee, will
be refused, is practically to determine that
sales of contingent interest will not be
recognized by courts of equity. Cf. Len-

nig's Estate, 182 Pa. 485 ; Wistar's Appeal,
80 Pa. 484.
Four years, however, have elapsed since
the contract was made, during which
the plaintiff has neither paid nor tendered
the purchase money, nor demanded a conveyance. He has waited until the event
has befallen, upon which Harrison ShilIon's estate was to vest. Equity will not
specifically enforce a contract where there
has been long delay in making payment,
especially if a material change in the value
of the premises has occurred. Bispham,
Equity, 437. While it remained dubious
whether Shillon would ever become
owner, Jeffries showed no ha.te to pay
the price and take the risk. Now that
the interest which he has bought, has
risen in value from $800 to $20,000, he bestirs himself, and demands performance
by his vendor. The circumstances exist
under which he should be'remitted to his
action at law for damages.
It is true that ejectment could not have
been successfully brought prior to the
death of Thompson, but that is not the
slightest justification for not tendering
the money to Harrison Shillon long ago,
and for showing a real purpose to insist on
the bargain by filing a bill in equity, before, after long delay, it could be seen how
the contingency was to turn out.
Judgment reversed.
NOLAN vs. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.
Negligence-Delay in sending messageDefendant liable-Measure of damages-Counter proposal not an acceptance-Plaintiff must show damage resulting from the negligence-Nominal
damages recovered.
For facts see opinion of Superior Court.
PARK and KAuFFmAN for the plaintiff.
Where damage results from negligent
delay on the part of a telegraph company
the company is liable. U. S. Tel. Co. v.
Wenger, 55 Pa. 262; True v. Tel. Co., 98
Mass.-239; Smith v. W. U. Tel. Co., 150
Pa. 561.
The measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the
market price. Manville v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 37 Iowa 214.
McNEAL and HENNEKE for the defend-
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A telegraph company is not a common
carrier. Grinnell v. W. U. Tel. Co., 113
lass. 299.
The liability of the telegraph company
may be limited by reasonable regulations
expressed in its contract with the sender,
as requiring a repeating of the message.
Psssmore v. W. U. Tel. Co., 78 Pa. 238;
Grinnell v. W. U. Tel. Co., supra.
Negligence constitutes no cause of action
unless it expresses or establishes some
branch of duty. Fox v. Barkley, 126 Pa.
164.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The two important questions which
arise in this case are those of negligence
and damages.
The plaintiff seeks to recover against the
telegraph company, for damages sustained
by the negligence of the company in delivering a message, and the amount sought
to be recovered is the difference between
the real value and the market value of the
horse. The law is well established that
a telegraph company, on accepting a message for transmission, is under a legal
duty to transmit it without error or delay,
and is liable in damages for any injury of
which its negligence in the performance
of this duty is the proximate cause. A. &
Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. 25, p. 778.
It has been argued by counsel forthe defense, that the breach of Streeter's contract to hold the offer open for forty-eight
hours, and selling the horse before that
time, constitutes a breach of contract for
which he should be held liable to the
amount of damages claimed against the
telegraph company; but we think that
Streeter's breach of contract is too remote
to be a cause of the injury to Nolan, and
that the proximate cause of the loss to
Nolan was the negligence of the telegraph
company in transmitting the message.
The rule is, that in such a case as this,
where there seems to be a proximate and
a remote cause of a loss or injury, the law
regards the proximate cause as the efficient and responsible cause and disregards
the one being remote. Herr v. Lebanon,
149 Pa. 2"22.
The defendants also allege that when
Streeter sent the message, he accepted
the contract on the back of the telegram
which is as follows: "It is agreed by the
sender of the following message, that the
company shall not be liable for mistakes
or delay in the transmission or delivery
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or for non-delivery, of any unrepeated
message, beyond the amount received for
sending thesame, nor for mistakes or delays in transmission or delivery." We
find no Pennsylvania authority on this
particular poi tt.
ft is conceded that the
telegraph companies may make regulations for the transmission of messages, but
it is established by numerous cases, that a
regulation of a telegraph company designed to protect it from responsibility,
for gross negligence of its agents or employes in the transmission or delivery of a
message, is unreasonable, against public
policy, and void. Candee v. Telegraph
Co., 34 Wis. 470; Tyler v. W. U. Telegraph Co., 8 Albany L. J. 181.
It seems to be the unbending rule that
a telegraph company, on receiving a message, is required to transmit it, and is
liable in damages for negligence so to do,
independent of any express contract.
Western Union Tel. v. Reynolds, 77 Va.
173; Vol. 5 A. & Eng. Corp. cases, 182.
But even for a very slight error, as in the
case of changing a word, sometimes, it
must respond in damages. It has been
held in one case, that a delay in delivery
of thirty minutes was not such negligence
9s would subject the company to any
damages, even though a slight injury
would result, and that it was a reasonable
delivery. Julian v. Western Union Tel.,
98 Ind. 327.
In this case arises the principle of
principal and agent, as in the case of the
Telegraph Company v. Drysburg, 35 Pa.
300, which held that a telegraph company may be considered as an agent of the
sender of the message, and is liable, as
wrong doers, for any misfeasance in the
execution of the duties confided to them;
also in support of this may be cited: Passmore v. Western Union Tel., 78 Pa. 238.
The question of the amount of damages
should here be considered. As was said
before, the damages to be recovered for the
negligence of a company, is the actual less
suffered.
The plaintiff claims to have
suffered a loss of the difference between
the market value and the real value of the
horse. The difference being $100.
In the case of the Western Union Tel.
v. Wenger, 55 Pa. 262, it was held, that
the company had incurred such a liability
in damages as the sender of the message
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had sustained in consequence of such
negligence of the company.
We, therefore, instruct the jury, that
the delay of the company, in delivering
the message whereby the plaintiffsufered
the loss he claims, was such negligence on
the part of the company as would make
them liable to such plaintiff, and that the
amount of damages to be recovered should
be the difference between the real value of
the horse and the market value, or $100,
and that verdictshould be for the plaintiff.
CLAYCOMB, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Streeter offered the horse to Nolan for
$300, Nolan to notify him of his acceptance
in forty-eight hours. Nolan, four hours
before the expiration of this time, telegraphed to Streeter that he would take
the horse, and directed Streeter to draw a
draft upon him at three days, and to send
at once, by mail, a bill of Sale, and, by railroad, the horse. The message was not
promptly sent, and in consequence, did
not reach Streeter until an hour after the
period of forty-eight hours allowed to
Nolan for the notification of his acceptance. After making the offer to Nolan,
Streeter had made another to Sergeant
subject to Nolan's option. A half hour
before the expiration of the twenty-four
hours, Streeter informed Sergeant that he
might have the horse, and Sergeant forthThe horse was worth
with accepted.
$400. This is an action against the Telegraph Co. for $100, the difference between
the actual value of the horse and the price
at which Nolan expected to get it.
The plaintiff had a right to expect the
immediate despatch of his telegram, and
for a failure to send it at once, could recover the resulting damages. What are
these damages?
We must assume, the contrary not appearing, that Streeter would have kept his
promise to sell, had he received a message
from Nolan, responsive to the offer, in due
time. He had, it is true, made an offer of
the horse to Sergeant, but that was subject to the option of Nolan. He, also, did
not wait until the expiration of the fortyeight hours, before informing, but a half
hour before informed, Sergeant that he
could have the horse. We would not be
justified in inferring, however, that three
hours before thus informing Sergeant, he

would have declined to let Nolan have the
horse. He was getting no larger price for
it from Sergeant than from Nolan, and had
no visible inducement to prefer the former
to the latter.
It was not necessary, in order to justify
a recovery by Nolan, that he should have
had an option for the forty-eight hours,
which was binding on Streeter. On the
contrary, whether the option was binding
on Streeter or not, if the acceptance is to
date from the delivery of the message to
the telegraph company, he had acquired
a right-to the horse, of which the delay of
the company has not deprived him. It is
only if the acceptance was not to be complete before notice of it to Streeter, that the
company has occasioned any loss.
We are of opinion, however, that
actual notice to Streeter was necessary to
constitute the acceptance. It does not appear whether the offer was made to Nolan
by word, by messenger, by mail, by telephone or telegraph. It does not appear
that the circumstances warranted Nolan
in using the telegraph as the instrument
If they did not,
of communication.
Streeter would not be bound as by an acceptance, from the mere delivery for transmission, to the company, of the message.
Streeter's offer was of the horse if within
forty eight hours Nolan should "notify"
him of the acceptance. In the absence
of additional evidence, we cannot regard
the deposit of the message as a notification.
From what we have said, it follows that
the reception of the message within the
forty-eight hours would have been necessary in order to bind Streeter. Hre was
not bound, and Nolan has lost the right to
the horse. But, let us suppose that the
message had been promptly given. Would
it have bound Streeter? If it would not,
its non-transmission in time, cannot be
supposed to have caused Nolan's loss of
the horse, for we cannot assume that,
Streeter would, though not bound, have
sold the horse on the terms presented in
it, In the absence of testimony from him,
or of other evidence, that he would. It is
a principle of the law of contracts that the
acceptance must coincide with the offer.
An offer for cash is not validly accepted
by a suggestion of payment in the future.
Streeter's offer was of the horse for $300;
i. e., for $800 to be paid on the delivery of
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the horse. The latter was to be simultaneous with the payment. But, what is
Nolan'salleged acceptance? He instructed
Streeter that he would take the horse, and
would pay, through a draft in three days,
the horse being delivered at once to the
common carrier for him. This is the introduction of new terms. It is not an acceptance, but a counter-proposal. in which
there is no evidence that Streeter would
have acquiesced. It follows that no loss
accrued to Nolan from the tardiness of the
defendant. Cf . Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Burns, 70. S. W. R. 784 [Texas].
Perhaps Streeter would have accepted
it or,perhaps,he insisting on cash, Nolan
would have withdrawn his counter-proposal, and accepted the offer made, but
about such matters neither we, nor with
our sufferance, the jury, may speculate.
The remarks already made indicate that
the judgment of the learned court below
must be reversed.
It was argued by counsel that the rule
of the company requires counter-transmission of messages, at an additional
charge to the sender, in order to make the
company liable for errors of negligence of
subordinates. But (a) it is not in evidence,
that such a qualification was attached to
the contract between Nolan and the company. (b) Such a qualification has no
relevancy to the cause of complaint in
this case. Cf. Tobin v. Telegraph Co., 146
Pa. 375; N. Y. & W. Printing Telegraph
Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298; W. U. Telegraph Co. v. Richman, 19 W. N. C. 569;
6 Cent. R. 565. Nolan does not allege that
the message was erroneously transmitted.
It was correctly transmitted. Countertransmission would have been useless.
The fault of the defendant was not its
negligence in the sending, but its negligence in not sending for several hours
after the leaving of the message with its
servants.
Possibly, while a telegraph
company cannot, by contract, limit its
liability for its own negligence, N. Y. &
Washington Printing Telegraph Co. v.
Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298, it, may limit its
liability for negligence of its seryants, itself not having been negligent. Passmore
v. Telegraph Co., 78 Pa. 239; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa.
442; Of. Willock v. Railroad, 166 Pa. 184.
That the company would have been

liable for the loss of the profit on the
horse, had its negligence caused that loss,
we think clear. Ordinarily, if nothing
apprises the company of the nature of the
loss likely to ensue upon mistake or delay
of transmission, only nominal damages,
or, at the most, the price paid by the
sender of the telegram to the company,
can be recovered. Ferguson v. AngloAmerican Telegraph Co., Lim., 178 Pa.
377. But when the telegram itself suggests the nature and possible magnitude
of the actual loss to arise from error, the
company will be liable for it. The actual
order by telegraph being for "two hand
bouquets," if it is delivered as an order for
200 bouquets, the loss to the addressee from
the effort to comply with the order, e. g.
$100, may be recovered by him. N. Y. &
Wash. Printing Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35
Pa. 298. If the telegram sends the addressee to South Carolina instead of Staten
Island, the extra expense, e. g. $71.25, can
be recovered. Tobin v. Telegraph Co., 146
Pa. 375. aThe telegram directing the addressee to buy for the sender shares of
stock, the company must anticipate a
possible loss in a rise in price of the stock,
if the message is not promptly delivered,
and will be liable for that rise. U. S.
Telegraph Co. v. Wenger, 55 Pa. 262. The
message being to an agent to sell oil, the
company will be liable for a loss if the
message delivered directs the agent to buy
oil.
Western U. Tel. Co. v. Stevenson,
128 Pa. 442. Cf. Passmore v. W. U. Telegraph Co., 78 Pa. 238.
As the plaintiff would apparently have
lost the horse, even had the company
promptly transmitted the message, the
defendant is not liable for the difference
between the value of the horse and the
price which would have been paid for it.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
DILLSTOWN BOROUGH vs. TELEPHONE COMPANY.
Bill in equity-Injunction-Fraudused in
procuringthepassage of an ordinanceAct of March 31, 1860-Ordiname impairingobligationof contracts.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Dillstown, a borough, authorized the
telephone company to plant poles, and
string wires between them, the company
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undertaking to plant the poles at pre-- and their acts declared legal, cities and
scribed distances from each other, and to
boroughs could be plundered at will and
render service gratuitously to the council,
the public left without redress. Borough
burgess, and other officers. There was a
business should be transacted in an ordersecret understanding that each of the
ly and dignified manner. Questions coincouncil who voted for the ordinance ing before council should be determined
should receive two hundred and fifty
upon their merits, uninfluenced by the
dollars in six months from the passage of
promises of pecuniary reward to the inthe ordinance. The poles and wires were dividual members of the body, and when
established and were used by the officers
a corporation comes into a court of equity
of the borough.
A new council having
claiming rights against the public, under
come into power, the ordinance was rean agreement purporting to have been
pealed on the grounds of fraud in passing
executed by borough officers, the agree.
it, and the officers undertook to remove
ment should be cohscionable, and should
the poles. The company resisted. This
have been obtained by fair and conscionable
is a bill for an injunction.
methods. fn the case of the Street RailYocum and COOK for petitioners.
way v. Inter-County Street Ry. Co., 167
The repeal of the ordinance is void bePa. 100, it was held that neither council
cause it impairs the obligations of a counor officers can contract in any other way
tract. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 I1. 253 ;
than by ordinance, and if such ordinance,
Moore v. New York, 73 N. Y. 238; Clark
giving consent to a corporation to use its
v. Elizabeth, 61 N. J. L. 566; Corn. v.
Patch, 97 Mass. 221, Freeport v. Marks,
streets or property, has been obtained
59 Pa. 257 ; Speer v. Blairsville, 50 Pa. 150.
through fraud, it should be treated as a
LouRimrR and JACOS for the respondprivate contract between the borough and
ent.
the corporation, and as such, is subject to
The ordinance which authorized the
the same rules that govern contracts becompany to plant their poles, is void, and
the company acquired no rights under it
tween individuals. Also People v. Obrien,
Act of March 31, 1860; Milford Borough
111 N. Y. 1. The act of March 31, 1860,
v. Water Co., 124 Pa. 610; Harrisburg v.
controls this case to a great extent. This
Telephone Co., 15 Pa. C. C. 518; Thomas
act provides that it shall not be lawful for
v. St. Ry. Co., 167 Pa. 120 ; Millerstown v.
Bell, 123 Pa. 151.
any councilman, burgess, trustee, manOPINION OF THE COURT.
ager or director of any corporation, muniFrom the record of the case it appears
cipality or public institution to be at the
that the telephone comp'My received ausame time secretary, treasurer, or any
thority to construct, maintain and operate
officer subordinate to the president, and
its line in the borough of Dillstown by
directors who shall receive a salary therevirtue of an ordinance passed at a meeting
from or be the surety of such officers; nor
of its council. The contract thus entered
shall any member of any corporation or
into has since been rescinded by a newly
public institution or any officer or agent
elected council on the ground of fraud in
thereof be in any wise interested in any
the passage of the ordinance, conferring
contract to the sale, or furnishing of any
the right to the occupancy of the street to
supplies or materials to be furnished to or
the telephone company. It seems to be
for the use of any corporation, munian uncontradicted fact that each member
cipality or public institution, of which he
of the council who worked for the ordi- shall be a member or officer, or for which
nance was to receive $2.50, six months
he shall be an agefit, nor directly nor inafter the same became effective. The sole
directly interested therein, nor receive
question for our determination, we believe,
any reward or gratuity from any person
is this: Is an ordinance, procured by
interested in quch compact or sale. And
fraud, valid? We think not. The ordiany person violating these provisions or
nance was obtained in a manner which
either of them shall forfeit his memberrenders the transaction irrogular, and reship to such corporation, municipality or
flects little credit either upon the councilinstitution and his office or appointment
men or the parties with whom they dealt.
thereunder, and shall be held guilty of a
If such men as these are entrusted with
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof,
the performance of important public duties
shall be sentenced to pay a fine not ex-
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ceeding $500. It was held In the Commonwealth v. Essex Company, 13 Gray 239,
that if the ordinance had been obtained
by promises to the individual members of
the council which improperly influenced
their action so as to render the ordinance
voidable for fraud, the borough could rescind the contract, just as in the case of
contracts between individuals. But who
was to rescind the contract in the case at
bar? Surely the persons who gave their
consent would not revoke it on the ground
of their own fraud. We think that the
action taken by the newly elected council,
was perfectly legal and binding upon the
telephone company. This question has
been settled in this state by the supreme
court, in its decision in the Lehigh Coal
and Navigation Company v. Inter-County
St. Ry. Co., 167 Pa. 75. There, the consent of the supervisors of Rahn township
to the occupancy of its public road had
been obtained by means of a contract
similar to the one made use of in the case
at bar. In that case, the consent of the
supervisor to the use of the road was given
in consideration of the promise of the railway company to provide embloyment for
the supervisor and his son, at an agreed
price per day. Mr. Justice Williams, in
this opinion, says: "This was a very plain
case of bribing a public officer. A consent
so obtained, if otherwise valid, could confer no rights on those who bought it. The
contract which was given for it was as
utterly worthless as the consent. Neither
the buyer nor the seller took anything by
their bargain; nor did the township
against which both buyer and seller were
contriving, lose anything by the transaction. And again, in Thomas v. The
Inter-County Ry. Co., 167 Pa. 120, the
same justice said: "The action obtained
in this case was upon a subject of importance to the citizens and taxpayers of
the district. The constituents of the bouncilmen had the right to have the question
considered on its merits, and determined
on the best judgment of the officers
authorized by law to speak for them."
We follow the rtile laid down in the
navigation company's case, with no doubt
of its wisdom or justice.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that
the ordinance of the Dillstown borough,
authorizing the telephone company to

construct and maintain its plant in the
borough, was procured by fraud, and
therefore void.
Injunction denied.
WILCOX, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

This is a bill by the company praying
for an injunction that the borough shall
not remove the poles which have been
planted by the company.
- That the borough has control of the
streets and can regiove purprestures and
nuisances therefrom, will hardly be disputed.
If the telephone company has
no right to maintain the poles, it should,
and if it does not, the borough both may
and should, remove them. Cf. City of
Philadelphia v. Phia. & R. R. R., 58 Pa.
253.
The company had no right to plant and
maintain its poles in the streets, unless it
got that right from the ordinance of council. That council can give such right by
ordinance, is not to be doubted, and it can
charge a fee for the exercise of the right.
Harrisburg v. Telephone Co., 15 Pa. C. C.
518; Millerstown v. Bell, 123 Pa. 151; 2
Boroughs, 59. As council gives the authority by an ordinance, the ordinance
must be so passed as to be valid.
The validity of the ordinance of Dillstown borough is not otherwise attacked
than by proof that the members of council
who erected it, did so in consequence of a
bribe. There was an agreement that each
of them, who voted for it, should within
six months, receive from the company

$250.
Ordinarily, the motives of legislators, or
the influences brought to bear on them,
in enacting a law, cannot be investigated,
for the purpose of rendering the law nugatory. Sunbury & Erie Railroad Co. v.
Cooper, 33 Pa. 278, and ordinances of boroughs or cities enjoy a similar immunity.
Borough of Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. 253.
But, Lowrie, C. J., remarked in the
earlier of these cases: "We do not say that
a party who has obtained the passage of a
private Act of Assembly, by bribery, imposition. or other fraudulent means, can
claim any benefit from it if the fraud be
shown; perhaps this would be treated in
the same manner as a judgment in court,
or a title from the land office, obtained by
fraud". After remarking that the courts
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will not, in general, inquire into the
motives of the council in passing ordinances, Dillon observes: "But it would be
disastrous, as we think, to apply the
analogy to its full extent. Municipal
bodies, like the directories of private corporations, have too often shown themselves capable of using their powers fraudulently for their own advantage or to the
injury of others. We suppose it to be a
sound proposition that their acts, whether
in the form of resolutions or ordinances,
may be impeached for'fraud [Italics Dillon's] at the instance of persons injured
thereby." 1 Munic. Corp. 311, 4th edition.
That an ordinance giving privileges on
the streets to a corporation may be avoided
on proof that it was procured by bribing
the councils, isasserted in Thomas v. InterCounty St. Ry. Co., 167 Pa. 120.
In the case just cited, an owner of property along a street was permitted to enjoin
the company frqm constructing its railway upon the street in front of his premises, that is, the court, in this collateral
way, treated the ordinance as void. It
was void, because the consent of the borough had not been effectively given by its
council. We doubt not that the borough
itself could treat the ordinance as void, by
compelling the company to remove the
rails or to refrain from laying them, or by
removing the rails by its own officers.
Dillstown, without repealing the ordinance, could have by its officers removed
the poles of the plaintiff.
It is immaterial that the succeeding
council, before abating the poles, repealed
the invalid ordinance. Repeal of a voidable ordinance may be unnecessary, but if
the first ordinance is in fact voidable, no
harm surely can be done to the beneficiary
under it, in notifying him, by a repealing
ordinance, of the purpose of the bprough
to treat it as null.
A ppeal dismissed.
LUTHERAN CHURCH ET AL vs.
REED'S EXECUTORS.
Wills-Legacies- When a
the realty.

charge upon

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

"I, William Reed, of Shamokin township, Northumberland county, and State
of Pennsylvania, being of sound mind,
memory and understanding, do make and

publish this my last will and testament,
hereby revoking and making void all
former wills by me at any time heretofore made.
"And first, I direct that my body be
decently interred at Jacob's church in a
Christian-like manner, and that all persons assisting in my burial be paid for
such service, and I direct that the graves
for myself and for my beloved wife, at her
death, be each walled up with brick laid
in cement and both well covered with flag
stone, and that a proper monument be
erected at each of our graves.
"Item. I give, devise and bequeath to
my beloved wife, Sarah, the use of all
my real and personal estate during her
natural lifetime. I order and direct that
the stock and farming implements be sold
after my death and that the proceeds
thereof be for the use of my beloved wife,
Sarah.
"Item. I give, devise and bequeath five
hundred dollars to Jacob's Lutheran
Church, the same to be in charge of the
trustees of said church to be by them invested in real estate security and the interest thereof to be pai annually toward
the minister's salary at said church.
"Item. I give, devise and bequeath one
hundred dollars to the Jacob"s Lutheran
Church, the same to be invested in real
estate security and the interest thereof to
be paid annually to the organist of said
church.
"Item. I give, devise and bequeath to
William R. Tietsworth, son of Alfred
Tietsworth, five hundreddollars, the same
to be paid to him after the death of my
beloved wife, Sarah, upon his arriving at
the age of twenty-one years.
"Item. I give, devise and bequeath to
Alfred Tietsworth five hundred dollars to
be paid to him after the death of my beloved wife, Sarah.
"Item. I give, devise and bequeath to
the heirs of my sister, Mariah Young, one
thousand dollars, to Elizabeth Deibler
one thousand dollars, to Juliann4 Rohrbach
one thousand dollars, and after the payments above mentioned all the balance of
my etate shall be equally dividedfour parts, and the heirs of my brother,
Simon Reed, deceased, shall receive one
part, and the heirs of my sister, Mariah
Young, deceased, one part, and Elizabeth
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Deibler one part, and Julianna Rohrbach
one part. The said bequests shall not be
paid to any one until after the death of
my beloved wife, Sarah.
"I do hereby constitute and appoint
Simon Vought sole executor of this my
last will and testament.
"In witness whereof, I, William Reed,
the testator, have to this, my will written
one sheet of paper, set my hand and seal,
this thirtieth day of March, A. D., 1901.
WILLIAx REED [SEAL].
"Signed, sealed, published and declared
by the above named William Reed, as and
for his last will and testament, in the
presence of us, who have hereunto subscribed our names, at his request, as witnesses thereto, in the presence of the said
testator and of each other.
CLARA V. VOUGHT,
J. W. SHANNON,
SImoN VOUGHT."
Are the legacies a charge on the land,
the personalty being insufficient to pay
them?
CLAYCOM B and JONES for the plaintiff.
That a legacy is a charge upon land,
need not be expressed definitely; the intention of the testator governs. McCorn v.
McCorn, 100 N. Y. 511 ; Estate of Barbara
Lutz, 50 L. A. R. 847; Meter's Estate, 169
Pa. 66; Com. v. Shelby, 13 S. & R. 347;
Clery's Appeal, 35 Pa. 54.
CISNEY and KEELOR for the defendant.
A mere direction that devisee shall pay
a legacy does not thereby create a charge
upon the land. Park's Appeal, 10 Norris
327; Wright's Appeal, 2 Jones 256 ; Hamilton v. Parker, 13 (Smith) Pa, 332. Personalty is the primary fund for the payment of legacies. Millon's Appeal, 46 Pa.
65; Brediu v. Gilleland, 67 Pa. 34; Com.
v. Shelby, 13 S. & R. 348.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Whether a legacy is charged upon the
real estate of the decedent is always a
question of the testator's intention. Tbe
language of the will is the basis of the
inquiry, but extrinsic circumstances which
aid in the interpretation of that language,
and help to disclose the actual intention
may also be considered. McCorn v. Mc'Corn, 100 N. Y. 511. The doctrine is well
settled, however, that legacies of money
are to be paid out of the personal estate,
and that if the personal estate is insufficient therefor, the legacies are to abates
unless the real estate is charged with the
payment of them.
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In construing a will, it is to be presumed
that no man, in making a final disposition
of his estate, will make a legacy, save with
the honest, sober-minded intention that it
shall be paid. But when there is no express provision, or no clear implication
that the legacies are a charge upon the
land, the realty cannot be charged.
In Brant's Appeal, 8 Watts 202, it was
held: "There is, however, a class of cases
in which a legacy may be a charge on
lands devised, in the hands of a bonafide
purchaser for value from the devisee; but
it must be a case in which a specific legacy
is annexed as a condition to the devise, or
when the lands are devised subject to the
A
payment of a sum or several sums."
direction that a devisee yield and pay out
of the land a specific sum, is a charge upon the land. Hoover v. Hoover, 5 Pa. 351.
This doctrine.was reaffirmed in Cable's Appeal, 91 Pa. 327, also in Hammond's Esta te,
In Lloyd's Estate, 174 Pa.
197 Pa. 119.
186, the following words made the legacy
a charge upon the real estate: "I order
that John Mills unto his own use, pay the
sum of one thousand dollars out of the
estate."
We will now turn our attention to the
will of Reed, and attempt to find his intention as indicated by the will itself. In
the second item he makes the following
provision: "I give, devise and bequeath
to my beloved wife, Sarah, the use of all
my real and personal estate during her
natural lifetime." Throughout the entire
will this is the only mention made of the
real estate. This provision postpones the
payment of any of the legacies until after
the death of his widow, Sarah.
In the last item of the will, testator,
after giving three one thousand dollar
legacies, directs: "And after the payment
of the above mentioned, all the balance of
my estate shall be equally divided-four
parts."
We think it reasonable to infer
that the intention of the testator was, that
his entire estate was to be reduced to
money, and this to be done previous to
the payment of the three one thousand
dollar legacies, above mentioned. He
concludes the item as follows: "The said
bequests shall not be paid to any one until
after the death of my beloved wife, Sarah."
Testator speaks of all the legacies as to be
"paid," and hence, treats the realty and
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personalty as a blended fund, out of which
the legacies are to be paid. This view is
strengthened by the fact that no disposition whatever is made of his real estate.
This doctrine is supported in Roland v.
Miller, 100 Pa. 47. In this case the testatrix directed that "all her personal estate
shall be equally divided among her children and heirs at law." In a subsequent
item, she makes a similar disposition of
the proceeds from any sale or sales of her
real estate. The real estate as realty was
not devised. It was held that at death of
testatrix there was a conversion of the entire estate, and that the realty and personalty was a blended fund.
In view of the cases which have held
the legacies to be a charge upon the land,
we are unable, in the construction of the
present will, to dhicover an intention on
the part of the testator to make the payment of the legacies to Jacob's church, a
charge upon his real estate.
We are of
the opinion, however, that the legatees
may look to the realty and personalty as a
blended fund for the payment of the
legacies, in so far as that fund will reach.
SHERBINE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

William Reed's will devised all his real
and personal estate to his wife, Sarah, for
her life. The stock and farming Implements were to be sold, however, the proceeds invested, and the income therefrom
to be paid to her during life. Then follows a gift. of $500 to the Jacob Lutheran
church, the annual interest of which was
for the minister's salary; a further gift to
the same church of $100, the interest of
which was for the organist. It is notsaid,
in immediate connection with these gifts,
when they are to be paid, but as all the
personalty and realty are given to the wife
for life, they are evidently not payable
until her death.
A gift of $500 to William Tietsworth,
and one of $500 to Alfred Tietsworth, are
directed to be paid after the death of the
widow.
After these follows the clause: "I give,
devise and bequeath to the heirs of my
sister, Mariah Young, $1,000, to Elizabeth
Deibler $1,000, and to Julianna Rohrbach
$1,000, and-after the payments above mentioned all the balance of my estate shall
be equally divided-four parts: "One be-

ing given to the heirs of my brother,
Simon," one to "the hefirs of my sister,
Mariah Young ;" one to Elizabeth DeibJer, and oneto Julianna Rohrbach. "The
said bequests shall not be paid to any one
until after the death of my beloved wife,
Sarah."
The property of the testator was real
and personal.
He devised both to his
widow for her life. We are not to presume that he died intestate as to the reversionary interest therein. He has given
legacies, payable upon his widow's death,
and has directed "all the balance of my
estate" to be equally divided among four
sets of legatees. This balance embraces
land as well as personalty. The case is
then, of a gift of legacies, and of a posterior
gift of the rest and residue of his estate,
including personal and real estate. This
makes the legacies a charge upon the land
as well as personalty. If the latter is in-.
sufficient, the former must answer. Bennett's Estate, 148 Pa. 139 ; Markley's Estate, 148 Pa. 538; 3 Liens, 517.
Appeal dismissed.
STOKES vs. JALOUSE.
Trespass--Removing party wall-Easement for support-Limitationsof such
easement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Stokes' grandfather erected a brick
house, twenty-eight feet wide and forty
feet deep. A lath and plaster partition
running from front to rear, divided the
house into two equal parts. Each part
had in it a door and a window on the first
floor, two windows on the second and
third floors. Stokes sold the one-half to
Jalouse. It was then in a very dilapidated state. Ten years afterwards, the
borough authorities condemned it as a
nuisance and Jalouse tore it down. The
eastern side'of Stokes house was then left
exposed, and the rain and wind have
broken the plaster. This is an action for
damages for breach of the right to protection from the elements.
MILLER and CORE for the plaintiff.
A partition in a house, when used as a
support by both parties, is a party wall.
National Bank v. Taylor, 44 Towa 343;
Schile v. Brokhahus, 80 N. Y. 614. When
the owner of two adjoining buildings
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grants one of them, without expressly
stipulating against the right of support, he
is presumed to respectively grant and reserve the right of support. Partridge v.
Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601.
The defendant
must compensate the plaintiff for disturbance of possession, and damage from
having left his house exposed. Eter v.
Layster, 60 N. Y. 253; Brooks v. Curtin,
50 N. Y. 639 ; Qwisher v. Sipp, 19 Pa. Sup.
Ct. 43.
BOUTow and VASTINE for the defendant.
In the absence of express contract,
owners of adjoining buildings or portions
of the same building, cannot compel each
other to repair his building or portion, in
order to protect the property of either.
Pierce v. Dyer, 109 Mass. 374. If one
owner removes his building carefully, he
is not liable for damages resulting from
exposure to weather of the other building.
Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This house was in such a dilapidated
condition when the defendant came into
possession of it that it was condemned by
the borough authorities as a nuisance, and
defendant tore it down, probably because
lie wanted to erect a new and more
modern building; and probably because
he was compelled to. He did not touch
the dividing or party wall, but simply removed that part of the building which
was situated upon his own land. Now,
in being the owner of a house which was
built so close to the plaintiff's house that
one division or party wall formed the
common support between the two buildings, was each owner respectively compelled to allow his whole building to stand
indefinitely one at the pleasure of the
other, (one the insurer of the other's
building), or be liable in damages one to
the other, if, in the course of improvement,
one removed his building?
Under Equitable Easements, Tiedman,
page 571, we find this statement: "If the
quasi-servient estate has been conveyed,
it is a question of some doubt whether
there is reserved to the grantor by implication an easement to maintain a burden
upon the granted estate."
In Sanderson v. The Coal Co., 113 Pa.
150, the Court said: "A rule which casts
upon an innocent person the responsibility
of an insurer is a hard one at the best, and
will not be generally applied unless required by some public policy or 'the contract of the parties." In the same case
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it was said : "We think that every man
is entitled to the ordinary and natural
use and enjoyment of his property; he
may cut down the forest trees, clean and
cultivate his land, although in so doing
he may dry up the sources of his neighbor's springs, or remove the natural barriers against wind and storm." Also that
"Damages resulting from another from
the natural and lawful use of his property
by the owner thereof are, in the absence
of malice or negligence, damnum absque
injuria."
Kent gays: "If the owner of a house in
a compact town finds it 'necessary to pull
it down and remove the foundation of his
building, and he gives notice pf his intention to the owner of the adjoining house,
lie is not answerable for the injury which
the owner of the adjoining house may sustain by the operation, provided he remove
his own with reasonable and ordinary
care. ' 2 Kent, Com. 437.
An easement, uncertain in its extent
and duration, without any written or
record evidence of its existence, fettering
estates and laying an embargo upon the
hand of improvement which carries the
trowel and the plane, and not demanded
by any consideration of public policy
should not be held to exist by mere implication.
Morrison v. Marquardt, 24
Iowa 35 ; Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 :
fRennyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. 147; Keats v.
Hugo, 115 Mass. 204.
In the case at bar, it must be remembered that the defendant did not remove
any part of the party or division wall, and
it is not claimed that said wall was injured
by the workmen who removed the building; but the plaintiff claims, 'by the removal of said building, the party wall was
left exposed to the rain and wind, which
cracked the plaster, thus damaging him.
It is well settled that an owner of land
adjacent to another cannot remove the
earth upon his own land so as to withdraw
the support of his neighbor's soil. If he
attempts to do so he may be enjoined, or
if done, he is responsible in damages. Zy
both the ancient and common law, A cannot dig a pit upon his land so near the
edge of it that B's land will tumble into
it; but this rule does not apply where B
has burdened his laud with artificial
weight, as by a building. It is strictly
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confined to cases where he has not thus
increased the lateral pressure.
In Clemens v. Speed, a case decided by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in June,
1892, we find a case analogous to the one
under consideration, and we think the
decision of that case is according to sound
reason and good judgment. It is said in
that case, as in this one, that a right may
be acquired in the form of an easement to
support from an adjoining building; but
the court said: "We cannot assent to this.
It would be a rule at war with reason and
justice. It would make the owner the
insurer of his neighbor's house, in case he
desired to take down his own, or was compelled to remove it owing to its condition.
It would make him liable for all damage,
however carefully he may have acted. It
would in great measure prevent all improvement."
"It is difficult to see how
an easement or prescriptive right can be
acquired to the lateral support of another's
building, when that of each owner is
altogether on his own land."
Therefore, we are of opinion that the defendant had a right to remove his building, if he used reasonable care and diligence to prevent damage to the plaintiff,
which he seems to have done, as negligence in removal is not alleged. We
think he is not liable to plaintiff for the
damage complained of as it was damnum
absque injuria,and no action will lie.
This case might have been decided upon other grounds., The building being
condemned as a nuisance by the authorities, etc. A discussion of which we forbear, as we believe we would have arrived
at the same conclusion.
EB1ERT, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The double house was so construced that
each half was dependent upon the other.
The division between them was of lath
and plaster, and the removal of one-half,
would expose this partition to wind, rain
and frost, and speedily destroy it, and,
meanwhile, make the other half uninhabitable. When Stokes sold the eastern
half to Jalouse, he impliedly retained to
himself, the right to Jalouse's omission to
do anything that would impair the protection on the eastern side of the western half.
Richards v. Rose, 9 Exch. 218 (3 Gray,
Cases, 485); Doyle v. Ritter, 6 Phila. 577;

1 Tiffany, Real Prop. 690; Pierce v. Dyer,
109 Mass. 374.
Stokes, however, acquired no right that
Jalouse should keep his half, or, particularly, the plaster wall, in repair. Though
the owner of an upper story has a right
that the owner of the lower shall not remove it, or weaken it, so as to impair the
support of the upper, he has no right to
compel the owner of the lower to keep it
in repair, in order that it may yield this
support to the upper. 1 Tiffany Real
Prop. 725. The same is true of easements
generally. The same principle applies to
lateral support or defence. Though Jalouse
would commit a wrong to Stokes, if he
tore down his house, or otherwise deprived
Stokes' east wall of its defence against
weather, he commits no wrong in not expending money or labor, in counteracting
the agency of natural forces which impair
that wall. Pierce v. Dyer, 109 Mass. 374.
The half sold to Jalouse was already in
a "very dilapidated state" at the time of
sale. Ten years have since elapsed. It
has become so ruinous as to have been
condemned by the borough authorities as
a nuisance, and, in obedience to their
order, to have been torn down. Stokes
knew that he did not, by selling to Jalouse,
impose on him the duty of maintaining
the eastern half in order to furnish protection to his, Stokes', eastern side. Jalouse
might have neglected to do anything to
his half, until its walls and ioof were
entirely destroyed. He had a right to
abstain from repair until a duty to the
public compelled him either to repair or
to tear down altogether.
When this option was forced upon him
by the needs of the public, we think he
had the right to exercise it without restraintof any duty towards Stokes. Stokes
must be regarded as selling the half to
Jalouse with knowledge that Jalouse need
make no repairs, and that, when abstinence from repairs compels re-construction
or destruction, he may, if he prefers, destroy instead of reconstructing. As Colt,
J., remarks, in Price v. Dyer, supra:
"It is to be considered that the necessity
which lies at the foundation of the right
[Stoke's] arises from the existing relations
of artificial structures, for the time being
constituting part of the freehold, but liable
to be destroyed by the action of the elements or by mere lapse of time. When
thus destroyed, it is fair to presume that
the parties intend, in the absence of any
agreement, that the easement shall end
with the necessity which created it. There
can be by implication, no mutual easement of perpetual support, applicable to
future structures."
Judgment affirmed.

